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BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB AND THE 
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D. THEODORE RAVE** 
Abstract: Although it is destined for the personal jurisdiction canon, the Su-
preme Court’s eight-to-one decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court does little to clarify that notoriously hazy doctrine. It does, however, 
significantly alter the balance of power in complex litigation. Bristol-Myers is 
a landmark case because it makes both mass-tort class actions and mass join-
ders impracticable in almost any state court outside of the defendant’s home 
states. With federal courts already hostile to class actions, plaintiffs who want 
to aggregate their claims will have to do so on the defendant’s terms: either on 
the defendant’s home turf or in federal multidistrict litigation (MDL). Faced 
with this choice, we believe that most plaintiffs will turn to MDL. The result 
will be the culmination of a trend toward the federalization of mass-tort litiga-
tion in MDL, which has already grown to make up an astonishing one-third of 
the federal civil docket. In this Article, we examine why Bristol-Myers will 
have this effect and explain how MDL’s hybrid structure facilitates centralized 
mass-tort litigation in federal court, even as the Court’s restrictive view on 
personal jurisdiction prevents similar aggregation in state court. MDL cuts 
this Gordian knot by formally adhering to the vision of vertical and horizontal 
federalism underlying both diversity jurisdiction and Bristol-Myers, while al-
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so paradoxically undermining that vision in service of mass resolution. As a 
result, even more power over mass-tort litigation will be centralized in the 
hands of the MDL judge and the lead lawyers the judge selects to run the liti-
gation—a prospect that comes with both opportunities and risks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, Americans have gone to California in droves, 
perhaps because of the weather, the booming economy, or the bountiful re-
sources.1 So too did 592 plaintiffs from around the country who wanted to 
sue for injuries they suffered after taking the drug Plavix, manufactured by 
pharmaceutical giant Bristol-Myers Squibb. These plaintiffs joined eighty-
six Californians alleging similar injuries in a series of product-liability cases 
in the Superior Court of San Francisco County.2 Bristol-Myers, for its part, 
did not want to litigate those cases in California, whose judges and juries it 
considered a little too plaintiff-friendly for its taste. For complicated rea-
sons, however, Bristol-Myers could not remove the cases to what it believed 
were the friendlier confines of federal court. So, Bristol-Myers tried another 
means of getting out—a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
over the claims by the non-Californians, derided as “litigation tourists.”3 
Rebuffed by the California courts, Bristol-Myers, as the saying goes, 
took the case all the way to the Supreme Court, contending that the non-
Californians’ claims lacked the requisite “minimum contacts” with Califor-
nia.4 The Supreme Court agreed by an eight-to-one margin in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, a decision that is likely to become a staple of 
first-year Civil Procedure courses everywhere.5 The Court held that to in-
voke the California court’s specific jurisdiction, each plaintiff’s claim must 
have some specific connection to the forum state. Thus, product-liability 
plaintiffs cannot sue a national product seller in any state just because it 
sells the same product there. Plaintiffs must either sue in a state that has 
some specific connection to their claim or else in the defendant’s home 
state, where the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Katy Murphy, As California Grows, Menlo Park and Other Bay Area Cities See 
Population Boom, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 1, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/
05/01/as-california-grows-menlo-park-and-other-bay-area-cities-see-population-boom/ [https://
perma.cc/RQW6-QXBH]. 
 2 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017). 
 3 See James M. Beck, Breaking News—Bristol-Myers Squibb Slams the Door on Litigation 
Tourism, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (June 19, 2017), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/?s=
Bristol-Myers+Squibb+Slams+the+Door+on+Litigation+Tourism [https://perma.cc/4EGQ-BYCR]. 
 4 Brief for the Petitioner at 13, Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466). 
 5 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 6 Id. at 1781–82. 
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Throughout the litigation, Bristol-Myers faced a key question: what 
exactly was wrong with California? After all, Bristol-Myers would conced-
edly have to litigate the California plaintiffs’ claims there, no matter what 
the courts concluded about the out-of-staters’ claims. Bristol-Myers had a 
major footprint in California: it employed thousands of people and sold 
over a billion dollars’ worth of Plavix there. Not to mention that San Fran-
cisco is eminently accessible, and probably more convenient than many 
state courts around the country where the out-of-staters might refile. 
There was, of course, nothing inconvenient about litigating in Califor-
nia. In reality, the stakes in Bristol-Myers had little to do with the traditional 
concerns underlying limitations on personal jurisdiction, such as distant-
forum abuse or state sovereignty, although lip service was dutifully paid to 
those venerable concepts. Bristol-Myers is just the latest move in the chess 
match going on in mass-torts litigation between plaintiffs who want to ag-
gregate their cases in the state court of their choice and defendants who 
want to prevent aggregation in the hopes that the cases will go away or to 
move the cases into federal court before a friendlier audience. Indeed, Bris-
tol-Myers candidly admitted that if the plaintiffs were prevented from ag-
gregating their cases in California, it expected that “a lot of those cases 
aren’t going to get filed,” or that they would be removed and transferred to 
a federal multidistrict litigation, or MDL.7 In fact, Bristol-Myers enthusias-
tically endorsed the MDL process, which would consolidate cases filed 
around the country in a single federal court that could be located virtually 
anywhere—including in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California, right down the street from the Superior Court they were so des-
perately trying to flee. In Bristol-Myers’s view, then, nationwide consolida-
tion in California state court was unconstitutional, but consolidation in fed-
eral court in California was perfectly acceptable.8 
This practice of forum shopping between state and federal courts is age 
old—plaintiffs will inevitably prefer one, whereas defendants prefer the 
other.9 In mass-tort litigation, the battle has continued unabated since new 
methods of aggregate litigation—like the class action—came on the scene 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Oral Argument at 23:00, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 
(Ct. App. 2014) (No. 16-466), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-466 [https://perma.cc/FW5H-
XN93]. 
 8 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 51 (arguing that multidistrict litigation (MDL) “has 
been used successfully countless times before”). 
 9 See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 
(2000) [hereinafter PURCELL, BRANDEIS]; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUAL-
ITY (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 
36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988) (describing the persistent debate over the relative quality of the 
federal and state courts). 
2018] The Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation  1255 
in the 1960s. When, in the 1990s, numerous decisions by federal courts 
made it difficult to certify mass-tort class actions, plaintiffs’ lawyers turned 
to more accommodating states.10 To combat that tactic, defense-friendly 
interest groups convinced Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (CAFA), which expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction over class 
actions to return them to hostile federal courts.11 But plaintiffs found ways 
to continue to aggregate in state court all the same by structuring mass join-
ders that are neither class actions nor fall within diversity jurisdiction, under 
CAFA or otherwise.12 So it was that 678 plaintiffs from around the country 
had managed to come together in a single non-class, mass-tort proceeding 
in San Francisco. And the Supreme Court sent them home in Bristol-Myers. 
Although it is already being hailed as a landmark decision,13 Justice 
Alito’s opinion for the Court tells us surprisingly little about personal-
jurisdiction doctrine. Indeed, the opinion pronounces itself modest: it claims 
to make no new law and explicitly leaves a series of rather thorny questions 
open.14 Much ink will undoubtedly be spilled attempting to glean the theo-
retical underpinnings of the Court’s latest effort to police plaintiff forum 
shopping, whether it is based on sovereignty or fairness, or some combina-
tion of the two.15 
But Bristol-Myers’s real impact will not be on the doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, it may not even be felt in much simple litigation.16 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 816 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1507 (2008) [hereinafter 
Burbank, Historical Context]. 
 11 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012); see STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND 
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 140 (2017) (noting 
the “strategy of those proponents of CAFA [the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005] whose actual 
agenda, in vastly expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear state law claims brought as 
class actions, was to ensure that the cases were not certified and went away”). 
 12 See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party Problem 
in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 809 (2006) (describing mass joinders); Daniel 
Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 287 (2016) (same). 
 13 See, e.g., Robert Channick & Becky Yerak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Make It Harder 
to File Class-Action Lawsuits Against Companies, CHI. TRIB. (June 22, 2017), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/business/ct-supreme-court-ruling-mass-actions-illinois-0625-biz-20170622-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/42WB-2XJG]; Beck, supra note 3. 
 14 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781, 1783–84. 
 15 We will not spill that ink here. This Article is not about whether Bristol-Myers was right or 
wrong as a matter of personal jurisdiction theory or the right or wrong way to think about personal 
jurisdiction. It is about how Bristol-Myers fits into the world of complex litigation. 
 16 This is not to say that Bristol-Myers will have no impact on less complex litigation. Plain-
tiffs may face new difficulties in cases involving multiple defendants, who now might not all be 
amenable to jurisdiction in a single state, such as cases pled on a theory of market-share liability. 
Further, to the extent that states competed to attract mass-tort litigation to their courts, their ability 
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Instead, Bristol-Myers is a landmark case in a different and perhaps bigger 
story about the balance of power in complex litigation. After the Supreme 
Court’s decision, we predict that cases like Bristol-Myers will not be split 
up and litigated in state courts all over the country, as the Court seemed to 
contemplate. Instead, they will wind up in MDL, which offers a means of 
centralizing cases filed around the country before a single federal judge.17 
The cases are centralized for the ostensible purpose of managing coordinated 
pretrial proceedings, after which they will be sent back to the courts where 
they were originally filed for trial, but the result is almost always some sort of 
mass resolution.18 Bristol-Myers is thus more than another chapter in the per-
sonal jurisdiction saga; it is a milestone in the ascendancy of MDL as the 
centerpiece of nationwide dispute resolution in the federal courts.19 
Bristol-Myers may impact some one-on-one litigation—though only a 
highly motivated forum shopper would try to bring a slip-and-fall case in a 
state where he neither lived, nor slipped, nor fell—but its effects on com-
plex cases will be substantial. Plaintiffs who have similar claims stemming 
from a defendant’s nationwide course of conduct (like a nationally marketed 
defective product) and wish to sue together will now face a more limited set 
of options. As we explain in this Article, although the Court claims to leave 
the question open, multistate or nationwide class actions based on state tort 
law are likely off the table in almost any state or federal court that does not 
have general jurisdiction over the defendant. Essentially, with some excep-
tions that we will discuss, after Bristol-Myers, mass-tort plaintiffs can either 
(1) assemble a nationwide group to sue together in state court in the defend-
ant’s home state or potentially a state where it directed nationwide conduct; 
(2) sue individually or in smaller groups in their own home states’ courts if 
they can find a way to avoid removal; or (3) sue in, or allow removal to, 
                                                                                                                           
to do so may be significantly hindered by Bristol-Myers. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
465, 497 (2015) (describing how states compete for mass-tort litigation in their courts); Klerman 
& Reilly, supra note 12. 
 17 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 18 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
67, 72 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies]. 
 19 MDL’s meteoric rise in the wake of the mass-tort class action’s demise has been one of the 
biggest stories in civil procedure since the turn of the century. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 155 (2015) (noting that “the most 
successful step taken in the administration of aggregate litigation in the United States was the 
creation of the JPML [Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation] in 1968”); Richard L. Marcus, 
Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?: Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Liti-
gation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2008); Thomas E. Willging & Em-
ery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litiga-
tion After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 777 (2010). 
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federal court (either in their home states or the defendant’s) where their cas-
es will be aggregated for pretrial proceedings in an MDL. In short, if the 
plaintiffs want to aggregate after Bristol-Myers, they will have to do so on 
the defendant’s terms—either on the defendant’s home turf or in an MDL. 
Given this array of options, we think MDL is likely to wind up as the 
dominant choice. Indeed, for plaintiffs concerned that a defendant has en-
gaged in preemptive forum shopping by selecting friendly places to incorpo-
rate and set up its principal place of business, aggregation before a federal 
judge chosen by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) may be 
preferable. The result of Bristol-Myers will thus be to vacuum many more 
cases into MDL’s ambit.20 For their part, defendants are thought to favor 
MDL because it creates a streamlined opportunity for global settlement with-
out the risks associated with class certification or parochial state courts.21 De-
fendants, of course, might prefer a world with no aggregation at all.22 But, at 
least as compared to nationwide class actions or mass joinders in plaintiffs’ 
handpicked state courts, MDL appears to be an acceptable alternative.23 
But why is federal MDL consolidation for pretrial proceedings a feasi-
ble option for aggregating these cases in a single court while the federal 
mass-tort class action failed?24 The answer, we think, lies in the magic of 
MDL’s hybrid structure. Formally, it is a loose collection of individual cases 
temporarily brought together for mundane pretrial processing, but very of-
ten it functions as a tightly knit aggregation from which a global resolution 
emerges, whether by settlement or dispositive motion.25 Indeed, despite 
MDL’s surface-level modesty, less than three percent of cases are ever re-
manded back to the courts where they were originally filed.26 This split per-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 221–22 (2015). 
 21 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 
399, 414 (2014) [hereinafter Burch, Remanding] (explaining why defendants prefer MDL); Linda 
S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 511, 553 (2013) [hereinafter Mullenix, Death of Democratic] (same). 
 22 See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 831, 875 (2017) [hereinafter Bradt, Radical Proposal] (describing defendants’ 
attempts to block the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968’s (the “MDL statute”) passage). 
 23 See John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Pro-
cess, LITIGATION, Summer/Fall 2012, at 26, 26 (“Overall, counsel believe that the panel is accom-
plishing its basic objective of easing the burdens of multiparty, multijurisdictional litigation on 
parties, counsel, and courts.”). 
 24 See Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settle-
ments, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346–47 (2014) (“As reliance on Rule 23 has diminished, MDL has 
ascended as the most important federal procedural device to aggregate (and settle) mass torts.”). 
 25 Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Mul-
tidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1270 (2017). 
 26 Burch, Remanding, supra note 21, at 400. 
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sonality permits MDL to accommodate the norms of traditional American 
one-on-one litigation far better than a class action, even while functioning, 
at times, like representative litigation.27 
MDL’s hybrid structure allows it to accommodate Bristol-Myers. Alt-
hough Bristol-Myers casts doubt on nationwide class actions in almost any 
court outside of the defendant’s home state, MDL is not a class action. In-
stead, MDL facilitates the transfer of individual state-law cases filed around 
the country to a single federal court, so long as those cases were filed in (or 
removed to) a district court that would have personal jurisdiction under ap-
plicable state law and the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Once such jurisdiction 
is established, the cases can move seamlessly into the MDL, wherever it is 
located. Because, formally, those cases are in the MDL only for “pretrial pro-
ceedings,” the transfer is considered temporary—never mind that it is usually 
permanent. MDL, therefore, fosters nationwide aggregation while paying 
lip service to the rudiments of individualization and decentralization.29 
If our prediction that most plaintiffs will turn to MDL as the best avail-
able alternative is correct, the result will be a nationalization of mass-tort 
litigation in federal MDL, even when those claims are brought under state 
law. In that sense, some fifty years later, this development fulfills the vision 
of the creators of the MDL statute. And it is consistent with the broader trend 
towards federalization of mass litigation evident in CAFA and more subtly in 
the expansion of preemption and other doctrines, as controversies arising in 
the modern economy routinely cross state and national boundaries.30 As the 
creators of MDL intended, national courts are being called upon more and 
more to handle national controversies.31 
There is much to be said for handling litigation of nationwide scope in 
federal court. And MDL succeeds at federalizing mass litigation where CA-
FA (predictably and probably intentionally) failed because its hybrid struc-
ture accommodates the essential features of our federal system in a way that 
the class action rule could not. Paradoxically, however, by paying lip ser-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 22, at 841. 
 28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
 29 Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1165, 1169 (2018) [hereinafter Bradt, Long Arm]. 
 30 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2008) (contending that “CAFA asserts that, in certain types of cases, the 
judicious administration of state law is better entrusted to federal courts”); Samuel Issacharoff & 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1354 (2006) (noting the 
trend in federalization). 
 31 See Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 22, at 839 (“The drafters believed that their crea-
tion would reshape federal litigation and become the primary mechanism for processing the wave 
of nationwide mass-tort litigation they predicted was headed the federal courts’ way.”). 
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vice to traditional norms of federalism and individualization, MDL may 
simultaneously undermine these norms in the name of mass resolution. Ag-
gregate litigation—and especially aggregate settlement—inevitably comes 
with pressure to smooth out some of the differences in the applicable state 
laws and water down the policies underlying limitations on state-court ju-
risdiction. Ultimately, the irony of Bristol-Myers is that, for all of its pro-
fessed concern for interstate federalism and predictability for defendants, 
what it really facilitates is consolidation of a nationwide set of claims in a 
single federal court selected by the JPML. 
Centralizing mass-tort claims in MDL is aggregation on defendants’ 
terms. Still, we believe that doing so offers potential benefits to plaintiffs 
and the court system as well by creating opportunities for mass resolution 
that can benefit all parties.32 Our view, however, is not entirely sanguine. 
Channeling more cases into MDL concentrates power in the hands of the 
MDL judge and lead lawyers who control the litigation and limits potential 
counterweights in parallel state-court litigation. What will ultimately matter 
in assessing this development is not the doctrinal niceties of personal juris-
diction, but rather how that power is deployed. Like any procedural device, 
MDL can be manipulated to the benefit of defendants, plaintiffs, or the law-
yers who represent them. Bristol-Myers thus increases the need to focus on 
making sure MDL processes and the outcomes they produce are fair—a 
project that we, and others, have pursued elsewhere.33 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we lay the groundwork 
for how we got here in both complex litigation and personal jurisdiction. 
We then take a deep dive into the Bristol-Myers litigation, which provides 
an extraordinary example of the moves and countermoves typical of modern 
mass-tort litigation. 
Part II does the doctrinal heavy lifting. In it, we discuss how Bristol-
Myers narrows the options for plaintiffs seeking to aggregate similar claims 
against a common defendant in a single proceeding. We then show why, 
given the available alternatives, the key players in mass-tort litigation are 
likely to channel even more claims into MDL. 
In Part III, we examine why MDL thrives as a tool for aggregation of 
nationwide mass-tort claims in federal court and assess the normative im-
plications of its continuing dominance. We show how the federalization of 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the 
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 413–18 (2014) (laying out the possible benefits 
of MDL for plaintiffs); D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 
66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192–98 (2013) [hereinafter Rave, Anticommons] (pointing out that there 
are advantages for plaintiffs and the courts in MDL). 
 33 See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 25. 
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mass-tort litigation in MDL can be consistent with a coherent view of both 
the horizontal federalism embodied in Bristol-Myers and the vertical feder-
alism embodied in Erie and Klaxon’s approach to diversity jurisdiction. 
MDL’s split personality allows it to accommodate both, while in practice 
subtly undermining the commitments of these doctrines. We then address 
some of the opportunities and risks that Bristol-Myers creates by increasing 
the centralization of mass-tort litigation in MDL. 
Bristol-Myers solidifies MDL as the primary forum for nationwide 
mass-tort litigation—at least for the time being. But resolving the battle 
over forum does not end the mass-tort wars; it just changes the terrain. Be-
cause MDL is so flexible, there is ample room for innovation and manipula-
tion. The new front line will be how MDL functions, and skirmishes have 
already begun in courts and in Congress. We close by previewing some of 
the potential fights to come. 
I. AGGREGATION AND JURISDICTION IN BRISTOL-MYERS 
To understand what Bristol-Myers means for complex litigation, one 
must understand two trends that have developed in parallel: the rapid 
growth of federal MDL as the central mechanism for dealing with mass 
harms that occur on a national scale and the evolution of personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine in a modern, interconnected economy. We set the scene for 
Bristol-Myers here by briefly describing these two trends. We then take a 
deep dive into the Bristol-Myers litigation, which provides a terrific illustra-
tion of the interests and strategies of plaintiffs and defendants in modern 
mass-tort litigation. 
A. How We Got Here in Complex Litigation 
Nationwide aggregation of claims from around the country in a single, 
massive proceeding is a relatively recent development, but it has been a 
central feature of American litigation for the last fifty years, for understand-
able reasons. For both plaintiffs and the courts, and, to a lesser extent, de-
fendants, there is a strong attraction to aggregating mass-tort claims. Unlike 
small consumer claims, which typically make no economic sense to pursue 
outside of a class action, mass torts often involve personal injuries where 
damages can range in the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars or higher. 
But even substantial claims, like those over injuries caused by defective 
products, can be challenging to bring individually because costly investiga-
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tion and expert witnesses can make such cases economically nonviable 
standing alone.34 
When a defendant has, for example, marketed an allegedly defective 
product to a national market, many cases that arise all around the country 
will share common features. By aggregating similar cases formally or in-
formally, plaintiffs and their lawyers can share information and spread out 
the costs of discovery and expert witnesses, giving them something ap-
proaching resource-parity with the defendant and increasing their leverage 
in settlement negotiations.35 Courts also favor aggregation to avoid duplica-
tive proceedings and to reduce backlogs.36 Defendants, for their part, tend to 
resist aggregation for all the same reasons that plaintiffs find it advanta-
geous, but given the inevitable pressure to aggregate mass torts, they find 
some forms of aggregation more threatening than others.37 
Aggregation of these claims in a single court, federal or state, would 
have been essentially impossible until the 1960s, when lawmakers devel-
oped two new tools: multidistrict litigation and the modern class action—
mechanisms largely copied by the states.38 After a period of popularity and 
controversy, the prevalence of class actions has declined.39 Today, the bulk 
of these mass-tort claims—at least the ones in federal court—have found a 
home in MDL, which, after several years of staggering growth, makes up 
more than one-third of the entire federal civil docket.40 But it wasn’t always 
that way. 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1943, 1952 (2017) (noting that the “cost of litigating [a plaintiff’s] science- or medicine-intensive 
case may exceed $250,000”). 
 35 E.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386–87 (2000); Rave, Anti-
commons, supra note 32, at 1192–93. 
 36 E.g., Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1991, at 5, 21 [hereinafter Resnik, Cases to Litigation]. 
 37 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Set-
tlements: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004) (describ-
ing how defendants cut deals with private claims brokers to settle tort claims en masse in the days 
before formal aggregation procedures like the class action). 
 38 Burbank, Historical Context, supra note 10, at 1486; David Marcus, The History of the 
Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 599 
(2013). 
 39 Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 (2013) 
[hereinafter Klonoff, Decline]; Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Re-
thinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014). 
 40 Samuel Issacharoff, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics, Ad-
dress at Duke University School of Law (Oct. 8, 2015), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/
centers/judicialstudies/snapshot_mdl_caseload_statistics.pptx [https://perma.cc/R9NR-8H7L] [here-
inafter Issacharoff, Snapshot]; see Thomas D. Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, JUDICATURE, 
Autumn 2015, at 36, 40 (noting that MDL is “dominated by mass torts”); William B. Rubenstein, 
 
1262 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1251 
The story of MDL’s rise from obscurity to prominence begins in the 
1960s when a small group of judges, led by Judge William Becker of the 
Western District of Missouri and Dean Philip C. Neal of the University of 
Chicago, drafted an innovative venue transfer statute and shepherded it 
through Congress.41 To Neal and Becker, developments in technology, pop-
ulation growth, the interconnection of the national economy, and the ac-
companying increased potential for widespread harm would combine with 
new statutory and common-law causes of action to create a massive amount 
of new litigation—as they called it, a “litigation explosion.”42 Their presci-
ence was remarkable; among the litigation they accurately predicted were 
nationwide product-liability cases stemming from defective drugs and au-
tomobile components.43 
To these judges, the solution to the litigation explosion was twofold—
and required a radical rethinking of the judicial role. First, the federal courts 
must be deployed as a single, national body.44 Rather than allow similar 
cases to be decentralized across the country, where the same discovery and 
motion practice would be duplicated over and over, risking inconsistent re-
sults, pretrial procedure must be centralized before a single federal district 
judge acting on behalf of the country.45 Second, the judges placed in charge 
of these cases must be disciples of the burgeoning principles of active case 
management; they must move the cases along efficiently, and not, in Judge 
Becker’s words, allow “litigants [to] run the cases.”46 
What emerged from these insights was the Multidistrict Litigation Act 
of 1968.47 The MDL statute created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation and gave it broad discretion to consolidate cases sharing any com-
mon question of fact and to transfer them to a single federal district judge 
for coordinated pretrial proceedings.48 While the cases are consolidated, the 
MDL judge has all the powers of any federal district judge to manage dis-
covery and rule on pretrial motions—including dispositive ones, like sum-
                                                                                                                           
Procedure and Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136, 144 n.40 
(2013), https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/61-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8BD-B6UY] 
(noting that “MDLs have become the form for resolution for resolution of mass tort matters”). 
 41 Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 22, at 839. 
 42 Id. at 890. 
 43 Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action 
Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1736 (2017) [hereinafter Bradt, Less and More]. 
 44 Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 22, at 864–65. 
 45 See id. at 864 (quoting from a speech by Neal to the Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference). 
 46 Id. at 878. Judith Resnik would later label this approach “managerial judging.” Judith Res-
nik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 375 (1982). 
 47 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 48 Id. § 1407(d). 
2018] The Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation  1263 
mary judgment.49 At the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, however, the 
cases must be remanded to the districts where they were originally filed.50 
So the consolidation is nominally temporary; the MDL court cannot try the 
transferred cases.51 In reality though, remand rarely occurs. Indeed, some 
ninety-seven percent of transferred cases have been resolved while consoli-
dated in the MDL court, whether by dispositive motion or settlement.52 
The MDL statute’s architects believed that their solution would be-
come the central mechanism for resolving mass torts in the federal courts.53 
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee that was contemporaneously drafting 
the revolutionary amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which 
created the modern class action, agreed with them. Although the Reporters, 
Benjamin Kaplan and Albert Sacks, recognized the “adventuresome” nature 
of some of their innovations to the class action rule—particularly the new 
opt-out class action in Rule 23(b)(3)—the Rules Committee believed their 
amendments would have the most impact in cases for injunctive relief, like 
civil rights cases.54 MDL—not the class action—was intended to be the 
primary mechanism for aggregating claims in “mass accident” cases, an 
understanding memorialized in the Advisory Committee’s notes accompa-
nying the amendments.55 Indeed, the reason there is a “superiority” re-
quirement in Rule 23(b)(3) is because of the Advisory Committee’s collec-
tive view that in mass-tort cases, MDL would be a more appropriate alterna-
tive.56 
Strangely enough, and to the surprise of the Rules Committee, the 
1966 Rule 23 amendments led to an explosion of class actions.57 Plaintiffs 
almost immediately grasped the power of the class action mechanism to 
band together into a formidable litigating force, not only in civil rights and 
small-claims cases, but also in mass torts.58 And although class actions had 
only a brief heyday in the federal courts, they took off in some states. The 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. § 1407(b); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 3866 (4th ed. 2017) (noting that “the transferee may rule on all dispositive motions”). 
 50 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 51 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998). 
 52 Burch, Remanding, supra note 21, at 400–01. 
 53 Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 22, at 839. 
 54 Marcus, supra note 38, at 608. 
 55 FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee note to 1966 amendments; Benjamin Kaplan, Con-
tinuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967). 
 56 Bradt, Less and More, supra note 43. 
 57 Burbank, Historical Context, supra note 10, at 1489. 
 58 Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 58–59 (2010); Richard S. Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: 
American Class Actions in the Twenty-First Century, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 500 (2016). 
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class action revolution—in all its forms—attracted massive attention and 
dispute, and numerous attempts at reform throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.59 During this time, MDL chugged along in relative obscurity, work-
ing rather effectively at consolidating a variety of cases, but always in the 
shadow of the class action.60 
When some federal courts began to show enthusiasm in the 1980s and 
1990s for using the class action to bring much needed closure to major na-
tionwide mass-tort controversies, such as the asbestos litigation crisis, the 
Supreme Court stepped in to rebuff those attempts in Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.61 In the years that followed, 
the federal courts have reached a rough consensus that mass torts like prod-
uct liability cases typically come with too many individual issues surround-
ing causation, damages, and frequently the applicable substantive tort law to 
satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).62 
With federal courts looking inhospitable, especially in mass-tort cases, 
much of the action in class actions moved to state courts. Some states, 
known as “magic jurisdictions” or “judicial hellholes,” depending on your 
perspective, became magnets for nationwide class actions and the potential-
ly massive verdicts and settlements that go along with them.63 This resulted 
in enormous outcry from defense interests. The worry was that a handful of 
state courts were particularly solicitous of class actions and willing to certi-
fy even questionable ones, thus exposing defendants to the risk of firm-
threatening liability in situations where the vast majority of state and federal 
courts would never have dreamed of certifying a class.64 Thus, an outlier 
state court—often applying its own substantive law under the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litiga-
tion: A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293 (2014) (providing a firsthand account). 
 60 Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical 
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 886 (2001); Resnik, Cases to Litigation, supra note 
36, at 29–35. 
 61 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 816; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 592. See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, 
MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007). 
 62 See David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications 
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1281 (2007). We do not wish to over-
state this point, as class action settlements are sometimes still used to resolve mass torts—though 
typically within an MDL. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 
821 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2016); In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F. Supp. 
2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014). We are hard pressed, however, 
to think of many instances since Amchem and Ortiz where the federal courts allowed a mass-tort 
class action to be certified for litigation through trial, verdict, and appeal. 
 63 See generally AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 
(2003), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2003.pdf [https://perma.
cc/G5U2-ZQK2] (listing and describing these judicial hellholes). 
 64 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 22–27 (2005). 
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Court’s loose constitutional limits on choice of law—could effectively rule 
on the defendant’s conduct nationwide and subject the defendant to ruinous 
damages.65 The solution was legislative, and one of the few successful ef-
forts by Congress to retrench private enforcement of the substantive law.66 
CAFA significantly expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction over puta-
tive class actions where there is minimal diversity and the class seeks an 
aggregate amount in excess of five million dollars.67 The result was to make 
nearly all class actions of significant size and any sort of national scope re-
movable. 
CAFA’s ostensible aim was to move nationwide class actions into fed-
eral court on the theory that national courts should handle controversies that 
are national in scope.68 But the more cynical view of CAFA is that its sup-
porters intended to move class actions into federal court to die.69 The criti-
cal doctrinal roadblock is that nationwide or multistate class actions based 
on state law will typically involve the application of many different states’ 
substantive laws to different class members.70 For the most part, federal 
courts faced with fifty different sets of applicable substantive law have re-
fused to certify classes because they cannot meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predomi-
nance requirement.71 Without a uniform federal tort law to go along with 
federal jurisdiction, nationwide mass-tort class actions are often unmanage-
able.72 And because the federal courts retain jurisdiction under CAFA even 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766–67 (7th 
Cir. 2003), abrogated by Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
 66 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 11, at 139–41. 
 67 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
 68 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 24–27. 
 69 Burbank, Historical Context, supra note 10, at 1528 (noting that CAFA is motivated by “a 
desire to give the corporate defendant a choice to seek, not a neutral forum, but a more favorable 
forum”); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the 
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1918 (2008) [hereinafter Purcell, 
CAFA] (noting that CAFA’s supporters’ “institutional forum shopping was entirely typical, for 
they sought not general reform but specific advantage”). 
 70 Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law Problem of Differing 
State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 374 (2011); Linda Sil-
berman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2034 
(2008). 
 71 Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009); see, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th 
Cir. 2007); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 72 See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law 
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1862, 1867 (2006) (explaining 
why nationwide class actions will move into the federal courts under CAFA); Suzanna Sherry, 
Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 
2139 (2008) (noting that there is no one federal tort law to unite a nationwide class action). 
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if class certification is denied, removal can sound the death knell for a puta-
tive class action.73 
The combination of CAFA and the Court’s earlier rulings on class ac-
tions was a double whammy.74 Most class actions could now be removed to 
federal court, where they would be governed under a hostile regime.75 The 
federal courts may have grown even more hostile to class actions in the years 
since CAFA, and not just in the mass-tort arena, with decisions like Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes76 (an employment case) and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend77 
(an antitrust case) increasing the bar for showing commonality and predomi-
nance in all class actions.78 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to 
further restrict the availability of class actions in state court when defendants 
include arbitration clauses with class-action waivers in their consumer or em-
ployment contracts.79 The combination of these factors meant that many class 
actions—particularly mass-tort class actions—were no longer viable.  
But the demise of the mass-tort class action did not mean the demise of 
mass torts or the pressures to aggregate them. With the class action unavaila-
ble, mass torts in the federal courts have overwhelmingly landed in MDL—
right where the drafters of the MDL statute and the 1966 Rule 23 amend-
ments intended them to be all along. MDL’s growth in recent years has been 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 22 n.203) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2832124&download=yes (collecting cases). 
 74 Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Just Choose: The Jurisprudential Necessity to Select a Single Gov-
erning Law for Mass Claims Arising from Nationally Marketed Consumer Goods and Services, 14 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 29, 47 (2009) (describing the choice-of-law problem as the “coup-
de-grace” for mass-tort class actions); Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: 
From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2012) (“Congress 
was plainly concerned that state courts were certifying too many class actions, and it plainly was 
hoping that fewer would be certified in federal court.”). 
 75 The degree of hostility in federal courts, as compared to state courts, is still the subject of 
debate. See Thomas Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Ac-
tion Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593 (2006) (as-
sessing whether federal courts display more hostility to class action litigation than state courts). 
 76 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011). 
 77 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013). Lower courts, however, seem resistant to applying Wal-Mart and 
Comcast in an extreme way, suggesting that they may not mean what those seeking to use them to 
the hilt say they mean. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Coun-
terrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1522–23 (2017) (describing 
narrower interpretations of those Supreme Court cases). 
 78 See Klonoff, Decline, supra note 39 (detailing the heightened burdens imposed on class 
action plaintiffs in maintaining their class status); Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 121, 130 (2015) (suggesting that decisions like Wal-Mart make it quite difficult to pursue 
class actions). 
 79 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
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meteoric to the point where currently more than one-third of all civil cases 
pending in the federal courts are part of an MDL.80 And the overwhelming 
majority of these cases—more than ninety percent—are product liability 
cases.81 Recognizing the tremendous savings in federal court resources that 
consolidated pretrial proceedings can offer, as well as MDL judges’ success 
in shepherding mass torts towards resolution through global settlement, the 
JPML is quick to create an MDL in tort controversies of any substantial 
size.82 
Defendants have been largely amenable to this development. If they 
have to face aggregation in mass torts, defendants tend to prefer MDL to the 
class action.83 MDL allows defendants to avoid the costs of duplicative liti-
gation without the risk that a single classwide verdict will impose firm-
threatening liability—a prospect that defendants often argue forces them to 
settle even questionable claims once a class is certified.84 And defendants 
may be able to eliminate wide swaths of claims all at once in an MDL if 
they can win a dispositive motion on a common issue or exclude critical 
evidence, such as the plaintiffs’ scientific expert.85 Perhaps most important-
ly, MDL collects the key players in a single place, making it easier to nego-
tiate a global settlement that will resolve practically all of the claims and 
allow defendants to move on.86 
The combination of CAFA and the growth of MDL in federal court, 
however, did not spell the end of mass torts in state court. Plaintiffs still 
often preferred to file mass tort claims in state court, in part because they 
perceived MDL as too defendant-friendly or slow-moving.87 Additionally, 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Issacharoff, Snapshot, supra note 40. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Willging & Lee, supra note 19, at 798. 
 83 Burch, Remanding, supra note 21, at 414 (“Centralization likewise advantages defendants 
by making meaningful closure possible through a global settlement.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995). But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to 
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (2003) (questioning 
whether defendants are truly coerced into settlement). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Zoloft Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 3d 483, 490 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 
858 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2017); Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Common Questions in MDL Pro-
ceedings, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 219, 221 (2017) (discussing other examples). 
 86 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class 
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2208 (2008) (explaining how the MDL process 
facilitates settlement). 
 87 See Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 994 (2012) (“MDL practice can be frustratingly slow, and judges may effec-
tively block plaintiffs from exiting by postponing adjudication of a motion to remand.”). Indeed, 
there is a heated debate among complex litigation scholars as to whether MDL more closely re-
sembles a roach motel or a black hole. Compare Rubenstein, supra note 40, at 146 (attributing 
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plaintiffs (and their lawyers) can typically retain more control over their 
individual cases in state court than in a federal MDL, where most of the 
important decisions are made by a court-appointed Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee.88 Many plaintiffs therefore attempted to aggregate mass-tort 
claims in state courts by eschewing class actions, joining non-diverse par-
ties, and structuring their non-class aggregations to avoid removal under the 
complicated exceptions to CAFA.89 
So, although CAFA prevented plaintiffs from shopping for lenient state 
procedural rules to certify a nationwide class, plaintiffs, of course, still 
sought to concentrate cases that could not be removed in a friendly forum. 
Thus, out of all of the states that could exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant and the nationwide set of claims, plaintiffs filed their non-
class aggregations in states where they thought the judges and applicable 
law would be most favorable. As we shall see, the plaintiffs in Bristol-
Myers pursued just such a strategy. 
B. How We Got Here in Personal Jurisdiction 
To fully understand the plaintiffs’ strategy and why Bristol-Myers suc-
ceeded, it is necessary to briefly survey the personal jurisdiction landscape. 
Alongside the developments in mass litigation described above, the law of 
personal jurisdiction has continued to evolve in fits and starts to accommo-
date the need to resolve disputes in an increasingly interconnected national 
and international marketplace. 
Though its roots go deeper, the personal jurisdiction story typically be-
gins in 1878 with Pennoyer v. Neff.90 Pennoyer is, by turns, fascinating and 
frustrating. It nods to problems of notice, federalism, inconvenience, and 
pragmatism, and Justice Field ties himself into knots trying to accommodate 
all of these concerns within territorial rules and exceptions to those rules. In 
                                                                                                                           
quip to Sam Issacharoff that “[a]n MDL is like a Roach Motel, cases check in but they never 
check out”), with Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2323, 2330 (2008) (noting that “MDL . . . can resemble a ‘black hole,’ into which cases are 
transferred never to be heard from again”). 
 88 See Burch, Monopolies, supra note 18, at 85 (outlining the advantages for plaintiffs remain-
ing in state court). 
 89 See, e.g., Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (involving an attempt 
to circumvent the removal process mandated by CAFA). 
 90 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719 (1878). See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was 
Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017) (explaining Pennoyer’s lasting importance in the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction). 
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short, Pennoyer is an ambitious mess.91 Its problems remain with us, and 
they resurface once again in Bristol-Myers. 
In particular, two aspects of Pennoyer continue to loom large: its link-
age of the limits of a state’s jurisdiction to its territorial sovereignty, and its 
enshrinement of those limits in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.92 As most law students would remember, under the Pennoyer 
regime, limitations on jurisdiction correlated directly with a state’s territori-
al borders—a state’s power over people and property within the state was 
absolute, but its process could not run outside the state.93 
Though this almost mystical concept was elegant, it simply could not 
keep up with reality. As time marched on and interstate activity increased, it 
became clear that a state often had a legitimate interest in deciding cases 
against out-of-staters. After a period of employing legal fictions to accommo-
date the Pennoyer regime to modern problems,94 the Supreme Court seeming-
ly abandoned it in 1945 with International Shoe Co. v. Washington.95 In that 
case, Chief Justice Stone explained that a state’s ability to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a defendant was a function of fairness and not territorial borders: 
hence the catechism that a state’s jurisdiction depends on whether the de-
fendant has “certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.’”96 
Over the next several decades, the Supreme Court sporadically decided 
personal-jurisdiction cases in an attempt to put meat on the bones of the 
International Shoe test.97 The states, now freed from having to pay lip ser-
                                                                                                                           
 91 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
241, 271–72 (“Pennoyer v. Neff arouses dismay and even despair. . . . That it survives at all is 
some kind of monument to American legal thought.”); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule 
of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 310 
(1956) (noting that “physical power fails completely as a rationale”). 
 92 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due 
Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 502 (1987). 
 93 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. 
 94 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (utilizing the legal fiction of implied 
consent to establish jurisdiction in a Massachusetts state court); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme 
Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 569, 573 (1958) (noting that “[t]he rapid development of transportation and communication 
. . . demanded a revision” of Pennoyer). 
 95 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 96 Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see Kevin M. Clermont, Restat-
ing Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 
416 (1980). 
 97 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189 
(1977); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957). After a flurry of cases following 
International Shoe, the Court took a nineteen-year hiatus from deciding personal jurisdiction cases 
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vice to Pennoyer’s strictures, had expanded their jurisdictional reach as far 
as they could, sometimes quite literally to the constitutional limit.98 As a 
result, interesting jurisdictional questions percolated up to the Supreme 
Court. The Court would decide them, sometimes adding or taking away el-
ements of the analysis, and sometimes seeming to narrow or expand the 
scope of the states’ authority. The Court continued in this vein throughout 
the 1980s,99 but after two cases in which a majority opinion could not 
emerge, the Court, for whatever reason, did not decide another personal ju-
risdiction case for twenty years.100 
With the benefit of hindsight, three aspects of the cases from the 1970s 
and 1980s seem to have been the most important. First, the Court settled on 
a test, albeit one that was quite adaptable depending on the facts of a partic-
ular case. Drawing from International Shoe, the Court had concluded that 
jurisdiction required a two-step analysis: first, an assessment of “minimum 
contacts” among the forum, the defendant, and the dispute, and then an as-
sessment of whether a state’s assertion of jurisdiction was nevertheless un-
reasonable, based on a laundry list of factors synthesized by Justice Bren-
nan in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.101 
Second, the Court had seemingly rejected federalism as an independ-
ent basis for limitations on a state’s jurisdiction. Although, dating back to 
Pennoyer, the Court had occasionally said that jurisdictional limitations 
were a means of preventing a state from overreaching to the detriment of a 
sister state,102 by the 1980s the Court seemed to have concluded that limita-
                                                                                                                           
before its 1977 decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, which applied the International Shoe test to quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction. See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 33, 34 (1978) (describing the Court’s re-entry into the personal jurisdiction fray). 
 98 Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention, and 
Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 210 (2001) (“[T]he greater latitude to assert 
jurisdiction afforded the states by International Shoe and its progeny dramatically enhanced the 
opportunities for interstate forum shopping . . . .”) (footnote omitted). Burbank notes, however, 
that despite this result, the Court in International Shoe may have been attempting to reduce forum 
shopping by facilitating greater latitude for the exercise of specific jurisdiction alongside a reduc-
tion in the scope of general doing-business jurisdiction, an approach that the current Court has, in 
part, embraced. Burbank, Historical Perspective, supra note 10, at 1478–80. 
 99 E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783, 784 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980). 
 100 E.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987). 
 101 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 485 (rejecting “any talismanic jurisdictional formulas”). 
 102 E.g., Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (“[T]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of 
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judg-
ment.”). 
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tions on jurisdiction served only to protect individual defendants from the 
“burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.”103 
Third, the Court had come to embrace the concepts of “general” and 
“specific” jurisdiction as a mode of analysis springing from International 
Shoe.104 International Shoe does not, of course, use this language. Rather, it 
originates from Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman’s famous 1966 
Harvard Law Review article interpreting International Shoe.105 But the 
Court adopted it in 1984 in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall (Helicol),106 and it is now the centerpiece of the Court’s jurisdictional 
analysis. Without belaboring the point, general jurisdiction is all-purpose 
jurisdiction over a defendant. If a state has general jurisdiction over a de-
fendant, that defendant can be sued in that state on any claim, regardless of 
whether there is any connection between the state and the claim. Specific 
jurisdiction is, as the label would suggest, far more narrow and requires a 
link between the facts of the case and the forum state. Without such a link, 
the state cannot assert jurisdiction over the defendant without its consent.107 
Until recently, the scope of general jurisdiction was thought to be quite 
broad.108 Drawing from language in International Shoe, a state was thought 
to have general jurisdiction over a defendant when “the continuous corpo-
rate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a na-
ture as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.”109 Although the Supreme Court did 
little to clarify the concept, the kind of operations that most courts treated as 
justifying a state’s exercise of general jurisdiction tended to roughly corre-
spond with doing business in the state—so if a corporation had a significant 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 
(1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power described in [Volkswagen], however, must be 
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause 
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”); see also Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. 
Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1177 (2014) (noting the Court’s “sharp break” 
with precedent). 
 104 See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 611 
(1988) (identifying the framework for jurisdictional analysis). 
 105 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
 106 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 107 Daimler, A.G. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (defining general and specific juris-
diction). 
 108 Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 
63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 675 (2012) (noting that “lower courts widely embraced the notion that any 
corporation ‘doing business’ in a state was subject to general jurisdiction there”). 
 109 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
1272 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1251 
footprint in the state, such as through employees, sales, or physical plants, 
general jurisdiction was thought to exist.110 
During the 1980s, the questions that reached the Supreme Court tended 
to deal with states’ assertion of specific jurisdiction over defendants whose 
only contact with the forum related to the particular lawsuit.111 The central 
question, as the Court put it in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 
was whether the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state.”112 The question of how related 
that particular lawsuit must be to the forum state was not addressed.113 
All of this changed when the Supreme Court broke its twenty years of 
silence and got back into the personal jurisdiction business in 2011 with two 
new cases: Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, both of which reversed state courts’ assertions of jurisdic-
tion, one for lack of general jurisdiction and the other for lack of specific 
jurisdiction.114 
Goodyear was perhaps the more surprising of the two. Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that general jurisdiction is 
almost always limited to the states in which a defendant is “essentially at 
home.”115 For a corporation, that typically means the state of incorporation 
and the state where the defendant’s principal place of business is located. 
This result was a surprising shift and unsettled quite a lot of case law.116 But 
in case there was any lingering doubt about the Court’s intentions, the Court 
has twice reiterated that general jurisdiction will almost always be limited 
to the two home states of a corporate defendant.117 And in so doing, the 
Court has come back under “Pennoyer’s sway,” suggesting that the re-
                                                                                                                           
 110 Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. 
REV. 527, 533 (2012). 
 111 E.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105; Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287. 
 112 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 113 Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Is-
sues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 617, 629 (2012). 
 114 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011); J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011). 
 115 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. 
 116 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 347 (2013) 
(arguing the decisions in Goodyear and Nicastro “clearly signaled a desire to contract the constitu-
tional ambit of that jurisdiction”); Stein, supra note 110, at 532 (noting that Goodyear “limit[ed] 
significantly the operation of general jurisdiction”). 
 117 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558–59 (2017); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61. 
2018] The Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation  1273 
striction on general jurisdiction is rigid and, at least in part, territorially 
based.118 
With respect to specific jurisdiction, the Court in 2011 seemed to once 
again be divided. The Nicastro case failed to produce a majority opinion. 
Instead, the court split four-to-two-to-three, with Justice Kennedy writing a 
plurality opinion that generated more confusion than it resolved.119 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, which rejected New Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction 
over a British manufacturer when one of its machines injured a New Jersey 
resident in the state because its contacts with the state were insufficient to 
show purposeful availment, seemed to bring territoriality and federalism 
back into the specific jurisdiction analysis as well.120 
The 2011 duo of cases has turned out to be just the beginning. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly returned to personal jurisdiction in the years 
since. Overall, the Court has exhibited a newfound vigor when it comes to 
policing the states—and plaintiffs’ attempts at forum shopping. Indeed, the 
Court has now heard six personal jurisdiction cases since 2011, and in each 
it has concluded that the trial court exceeded the limitations of the Four-
teenth Amendment.121 The Court’s rather aggressive reentry into the fray 
after two decades of benign neglect has generated a series of new questions, 
in large part because the Court has been rather obscure about the purposes 
of jurisdictional limitations underlying its new doctrinal rules.122 
Among the open questions was the one presented by the Bristol-Myers 
case: How related to the forum state does a plaintiff’s claim have to be 
when the defendant purposefully avails itself of the markets in every state 
through a nationwide course of conduct?123 The plaintiffs’ carefully con-
                                                                                                                           
 118 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58 (“Specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s 
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 119 Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 877. 
 120 Id. at 884. 
 121 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777; BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1554; Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 
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structed attempt in Bristol-Myers to avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA 
forced the issue. 
C. The Bristol-Myers Litigation 
On the substance, Bristol-Myers is something of a standard defective-
drug case. Bristol-Myers, a major international pharmaceutical company 
incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in New York, 
developed and manufactured a blood-thinning drug called clopidogrel, mar-
keted as Plavix.124 To say that Plavix was a success would be an under-
statement; it was, for a time, the best-selling prescription drug in the coun-
try.125 In 2011 alone, the year before its patent expired, allowing for generic 
competition, U.S. sales totaled over seven billion dollars, and the drug gen-
erated over forty billion dollars in revenue for Bristol-Myers.126 Unfortu-
nately, at least some users taking Plavix allegedly suffered severe side ef-
fects, including heart attacks, strokes, and internal bleeding. As a result, 
litigation has proliferated nationwide against Bristol-Myers.127 
Much of that litigation was (and remains) in federal court, consolidated 
in an MDL assigned to Judge Freda Wolfson in the District of New Jersey.128 
That is, the cases that were either filed in or properly removed to federal 
courts around the country were transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to the 
Garden State for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Any plaintiffs (or lawyers) 
who hoped to avoid MDL would have to construct a case outside the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts—that is, a case whose claims arose 
under state law and was not removable as a diversity case, whether under the 
general diversity statute or CAFA. Bristol-Myers was such a case. 
1. The California Courts 
Apparently preferring California state court to the federal MDL, 678 
individuals joined in eight separate complaints against Bristol-Myers in Su-
perior Court in San Francisco, California. Eighty-six of those plaintiffs were 
                                                                                                                           
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc. 514 F.3d 1063, 1078 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing 
the three different approaches courts have adopted). 
 124 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–78. 
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 126 Katie Thomas, Plavix Set to Lose Patent Protection, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012, at B1 
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 127 In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 923 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 
1377 (J.P.M.L. 2013). 
 128 Id. at 1379–80. 
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from California; the other 592 hailed from thirty-three other states.129 Pur-
suant to California procedural rules, the actions were assigned as a coordi-
nated matter to a single judge. The cases could not be removed for two rea-
sons. First, because the plaintiffs joined a second defendant, the California-
based distributor, McKesson, there was not complete diversity, and the cas-
es therefore could not be removed unless they fell within the ambit of CA-
FA, which requires only minimal diversity. Second, the cases were carefully 
constructed to avoid CAFA. Not only were the cases not styled as class ac-
tions, but each complaint joined fewer than one-hundred plaintiffs, meaning 
that they could not be removed under CAFA’s provision for removal of 
“mass actions,” which requires one-hundred plaintiffs.130 Ultimately, then, 
the plaintiffs were able to construct a functional nationwide mass-tort action 
in California state court including almost seven-hundred plaintiffs that 
could not be removed.131 
Stuck in state court, Bristol-Myers moved to dismiss the claims of the 
non-Californian plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground 
that there were not sufficient contacts between those plaintiffs’ claims and 
California. That is, because Bristol-Myers was not at home in California, 
there was no general jurisdiction, and because these plaintiffs were both 
domiciled and allegedly injured by Plavix that was prescribed and con-
sumed in other states, there was no specific jurisdiction. 
Prior to 2011, Bristol-Myers’s motion would have been a non-starter. 
Until Goodyear, Bristol-Myers would almost certainly have been subject to 
general jurisdiction in California, based simply on the scope and continu-
ousness of its contacts with the state: to wit, its nearly one billion dollars in 
sales of Plavix in California, its registration to do business in the state, and 
therefore, its appointment of an agent to receive service of process, and its 
operation of five offices and employment of some four-hundred people in 
the state. It was only after the Supreme Court announced Goodyear’s rule 
limiting general jurisdiction to states in which the defendant corporation 
was “essentially at home” that Bristol-Myers had a leg to stand on in con-
testing jurisdiction.132 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 130 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
 131 Early on in the litigation, Bristol-Myers tried removal and was rebuffed by the federal 
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In fact, the trial court, perhaps having not yet adjusted to the new para-
digm under Goodyear, found general jurisdiction.133 But the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed on different grounds.134 It held that, although general juris-
diction was lacking, California did have specific jurisdiction over the claims 
asserted by the out-of-staters because Bristol-Myers’s “sale of more than a 
billion dollars of Plavix to Californians . . . is substantially connected to the 
[out-of-staters’] claims, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as 
those alleged by the California resident plaintiffs.”135 And, in the court’s 
view, Bristol-Myers had not established that it would be unreasonable for 
California to assert jurisdiction over it. The court explained that Bristol-
Myers “seeks dismissal of their claims in order to force [plaintiffs] to refile 
in other states, allowing [Bristol-Myers] to try again to remove the cases to 
federal courts and then have them transferred to the MDL court, where its 
defenses might be more favorably received than in state courts.”136 The 
court roundly rejected the notion that those interests are protected by the 
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction: “[Bristol-Myers’s] due process 
rights do not include discouraging plaintiffs who may or may not have 
meritorious claims from pursuing them in an appropriate forum. Nor does 
due process entitle [Bristol-Myers] to avoid the differences in procedures 
that exist between state and federal courts . . . .”137 
The Supreme Court of California affirmed by a four-to-three vote.138 
The majority concluded that the scope of Bristol-Myers’s activities in Cali-
fornia, although insufficient for general jurisdiction under Goodyear and 
Daimler, clearly constituted purposeful availment of the California mar-
ket.139 In determining specific jurisdiction, the majority adopted a “sliding 
scale approach,” under which “the more wide ranging the defendant’s fo-
rum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum 
contacts and the claim.”140 The court found that because Bristol-Myers’s 
“contacts with California are substantial and the company has enjoyed size-
able revenues from the sales of its product here—the very product that is 
the subject of the claims of all of the plaintiffs,” the company’s “extensive 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Plavix Prod. & Mktg. Cases, No. JCCP4748, 2013 WL 6150251, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
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contacts with California establish minimum contacts based on a less direct 
connection between [its] forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than might 
otherwise be required.”141 
With minimum contacts established, the California Supreme Court 
turned to whether California’s assertion of jurisdiction was nevertheless 
unreasonable and made two points worth raising here. First, the court noted, 
accurately, that Bristol-Myers had not argued that California was an unduly 
inconvenient or burdensome location to litigate.142 Second, the court ex-
plained that the several states’ shared interest in “fair, efficient, and speedy 
administration of justice” for all parties weighed in favor of California’s 
accepting jurisdiction over all of the plaintiffs’ claims.143 In sum, California 
saw nothing wrong with deciding the claims of plaintiffs from all over the 
country in its courts.144 
2. The U.S. Supreme Court 
Inevitably a cert petition followed.145 It is necessary to linger on how 
Bristol-Myers briefed and argued the case because doing so provides insight 
into the Court’s opinion and its effect on aggregate litigation. 
Bristol-Myers’s plea to the Supreme Court was not the usual grist for 
personal jurisdiction mill. It did not argue that the plaintiffs’ choice of Cali-
fornia state courts was a kind of “distant forum abuse” or that litigating the 
cases in California would be inconvenient, expensive, or burdensome.146 How 
could it? Bristol-Myers had a substantial presence in California and had to 
defend the identical claims of California plaintiffs there. Bristol-Meyers sug-
gested that allowing out-of-state plaintiffs to sue in California would “rob 
corporate defendants of the predictability that the Due Process Clause is sup-
posed to provide them.”147 But what predictability did Bristol-Myers mean? 
After all, Bristol-Myers acknowledged that at the time of the events at issue 
in the case (prior to Goodyear and Daimler) it would have been subject to 
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 142 Id. at 892. 
 143 Id. at 893. 
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 147 Id. at 30. 
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general jurisdiction “in every state where [it] had systematic and continuous 
operations.”148 And even under a narrow view of specific jurisdiction, it was 
entirely predictable that it could be sued in California—it sold millions of 
Plavix pills that allegedly caused injury there. 
What Bristol-Myers was most worried about was plaintiffs’ ability to 
aggregate nationwide claims in a single state’s courts other than the ones in 
which it had chosen to incorporate or base its operations. It was explicitly 
and especially concerned about California, which is both “the largest market 
in the country” and “plaintiff-friendly.”149 If California’s approach to specif-
ic jurisdiction could prevail, corporate defendants would be put to the Hob-
son’s choice of facing a nationwide set of claims in California state court or 
“pulling out of the California market altogether.”150 
Thus, Bristol-Myers’s primary argument was not that litigating in Cali-
fornia was geographically inconvenient or unconstitutionally burdensome, 
but that its courts were too plaintiff-friendly—too hostile to an out-of-state 
corporate defendant—to be trusted with a nationwide aggregation of cas-
es.151 What emerges, then, is a personal jurisdiction argument more akin to 
those advanced in favor of federal diversity jurisdiction. 
For example, the cert petition emphasized that courts in the Ninth Cir-
cuit would be unlikely to adopt California’s new “sliding scale,” thus creat-
ing a “specific enticement to forum-shop.”152 That is, if California state 
courts would assume a broader scope of jurisdiction than federal courts sit-
ting in the same state, then plaintiffs would “shop their claims to the more 
hospitable courthouse” by adding a non-diverse defendant to prevent re-
moval, as these plaintiffs had by joining McKesson.153 This doctrinal incon-
sistency would be “practically important for corporate defendants,” because 
plaintiffs would be “allow[ed] . . . to shop claims with no causal connection 
to a defendant’s California activities to what their counsel view as the more 
plaintiff-friendly California courts. . . . Plaintiffs should not be allowed to 
take their case to the most hospitable forum they can think of.”154 
Bristol-Myers implicitly reaffirmed this notion in its merits brief, 
which argued that, although aggregation of a nationwide set of claims in 
California state court was unacceptable, a federal MDL would be just fi-
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ne.155 According to Bristol-Myers, a federal MDL would capture the effi-
ciency benefits of nationwide aggregation while avoiding the jurisdictional 
limitations of California.156 What makes this argument odd from a personal 
jurisdiction perspective is that the JPML could have established an MDL 
consolidating pretrial proceedings for all Plavix claims in any federal court, 
including the Northern District of California, a block away from the state 
court whose jurisdiction Bristol-Myers was vigorously contesting. Bristol-
Myers’s enthusiasm for MDL, then, amplified that their problem with Cali-
fornia was its state courts, not its geographic location. 
Indeed, at oral argument, when Justice Kagan asked Bristol-Myers’s 
attorney why litigating these cases in California would be unconstitutionally 
unfair, he responded that the problem was that California’s supposedly bi-
ased procedural and choice-of-law rules would govern the set of cases.157 
Plaintiffs would therefore have the opportunity to “play by least common 
denominator rules and file Ohio claims in California or Alaska.”158 When 
Justice Breyer recognized that such a conclusion might threaten the viability 
of nationwide class actions or even MDL in federal courts, Bristol-Myers 
responded: “[W]e think you should write an opinion for us that doesn’t deal 
with multidistrict litigation or class actions . . . .”159 
Eventually, the Court took this suggestion, reversing the Supreme 
Court of California by a vote of eight-to-one, with Justice Sotomayor as the 
lone dissenter.160 Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court was short and pur-
portedly modest. It proclaimed that no new law was necessary; a straight-
forward application of prior precedent would suffice to reverse.161 In some 
respects, Justice Alito’s opinion is, in fact, quite clear. But below the sur-
face, it provokes significant questions. 
The Court roundly rejected California’s “sliding scale” approach, call-
ing it a “loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”162 To the contrary, 
“[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested 
Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the 
non-residents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over 
the nonresidents’ claims.”163 In short, “[w]hat is needed—and what is miss-
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ing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at is-
sue.”164 Because the plaintiffs here “are not California residents,” “do not 
claim to have suffered harm in that State,” and “the conduct giving rise to 
the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere,” specific jurisdiction is lack-
ing.165 In the Court’s view, no more needed to be said, and no new law 
needed to be made. 
The Court should be applauded, at least, for brevity, but perhaps inevi-
tably, the opinion raises numerous questions. First, it does not clarify what 
kind of a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue” 
specific jurisdiction requires.166 To be sure, the Court says that there is no 
specific jurisdiction in California over claims by plaintiffs who neither re-
side nor were injured in the state, but the Court does not say what sort of 
contacts would be sufficient. The Court did not adopt Bristol-Myers’s ar-
gument that the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum state must 
be the “proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s alleged injury—an approach that 
would have wreaked havoc on even simple claims arising out of products 
that cross state lines.167 But the Court never explained exactly how “related” 
the plaintiffs’ claims must be to the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
state. 
Second, the Court does not clearly explain the rationale for rejecting 
jurisdiction in California. In fact, the Court is quite obscure; it says only 
that specific jurisdiction requires a consideration of a “variety of inter-
ests.”168 The “primary concern” remains the “burden on the defendant” and 
“the practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum.”169 The Court 
never, however, suggests that any such problems exist in this case—indeed, 
to do so would be to make an argument that Bristol-Myers never asserted. 
But, as the Court says, there is also something else to consider: “the more 
                                                                                                                           
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 1782. 
 166 Id. at 1781. 
 167 See id. at 1788 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor explained: 
Bristol-Myers urges such a rule upon us . . . but its adoption would have conse-
quences far beyond those that follow from today’s factbound opinion. Among other 
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Respondents, Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466). 
 168 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. 
 169 Id. 
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abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have 
little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”170 Hearkening back to 
language in Hanson v. Denckla and World-Wide Volkswagen—and seeming-
ly forgetting about language in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Com-
pagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, which rejected federalism as a basis for 
limitations on jurisdiction—the Court proclaimed interstate federalism as a 
potentially “decisive” reason why a state may not exercise jurisdiction.171 
That is, personal jurisdiction here works as a limitation on states’ overreach-
ing to the detriment of sister states—a justification thought to have been off 
the table. 
But even if one accepts (as we must) that Justice Alito is correct that 
interstate federalism is integral to the jurisdictional analysis, the Court nev-
er gets around to explaining why California’s assertion of jurisdiction in this 
case is either harmful to other states, or to the defendant. Instead, the Court 
says only that the contacts are insufficient under the International Shoe rule. 
There is no conclusion to the argument—instead, the reader is left to close 
the loop herself. 
Finally, as Justice Sotomayor points out in her dissent,172 and the Court 
itself acknowledges, the opinion leaves a number of questions open. For 
instance, as Bristol-Myers suggested at oral argument, the Court never ad-
dressed the impact this case might have on class actions. And the Court fur-
ther avoids the problem of the impact on MDL in the federal courts on the 
ground that limits on the personal jurisdiction of federal courts under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are not implicated.173 But it is in 
precisely the types of cases that the Court tried to duck, that its decision 
may have the most profound impact. 
II. BRISTOL-MYERS’S IMPACT ON AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
Although Bristol-Myers does not purport to affect the law of aggregate 
litigation, its impacts in that area are likely to be far greater than on ordi-
nary one-on-one litigation. Most plaintiffs in one-off cases are probably 
content to file at home or in the state where they suffered injury (if the two 
forums are even different). And the Court’s refusal to adopt the defendant’s 
proposed proximate cause test means that plaintiffs will still be free to sue 
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in their home states—or at least as free as they were under Nicastro.174 But 
plaintiffs who wish to band together in some form of aggregate litigation 
will see the impacts of Bristol-Myers almost immediately. 
The Bristol-Myers decision significantly limits plaintiffs’ menu of fo-
rums for filing an aggregated action—either as a class action or a mass 
joinder—in state court. Indeed, after Bristol-Myers, in most instances it is 
unlikely that plaintiffs could maintain a multistate class action or mass join-
der in state court anywhere other than the defendant’s home state(s). If 
plaintiffs want to bring aggregate litigation outside of the defendant’s home 
state after Bristol-Myers, their only practical option may be federal MDL. 
Aggregation, if it is going to happen, will be on defendants’ terms. 
To understand why Bristol-Myers will have this effect, it is necessary 
to walk through the various aggregation possibilities. 
A. Class Actions 
Although the Supreme Court leaves the question open, after Bristol-
Myers, it is difficult to see how most nationwide or multistate class actions 
could be maintained outside of the defendant’s home state where it is sub-
ject to general jurisdiction, unless it directs its nationwide conduct from 
another single state or consents to being sued. Bristol-Myers’s restriction of 
plaintiffs’ ability to shop for the most advantageous forum to litigate a class 
action is unquestionably significant, from the plaintiffs’ perspective, but it is 
not necessarily alarming or even all that surprising. Indeed, then Professor 
(now Judge) Diane Wood predicted this outcome thirty years ago in an arti-
cle suggesting that the nationwide class action was in significant tension 
with the personal jurisdiction doctrine then emanating from the Supreme 
Court.175 And since CAFA, most multistate class actions of any conse-
quence have already wound up in federal courts widely perceived as less 
hospitable to class actions than some of their more accommodating state 
counterparts.176 But the defendant’s ability to consent to personal jurisdic-
tion in any state for purposes of settling a class action is far more conse-
quential and potentially alarming. After Bristol-Myers, most class actions 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Of course, the plaintiff in Nicastro both resided and was injured in New Jersey, but a ma-
jority of the Court held that New Jersey did not have jurisdiction over the British manufacturer of 
the allegedly defective machine. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011). 
Bristol-Myers does nothing to improve Mr. Nicastro’s situation; it may in fact make it worse, to 
the extent that there was any room left under Nicastro to sue in some other state. 
 175 Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 614–18 
(1987). 
 176 See supra notes 34–89 and accompanying text. 
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will likely either be litigated in federal court in the defendant’s home state 
or settled in the state court of the defendant’s choosing. 
The problem is not jurisdiction over the plaintiff class. Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts established that it does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment for state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent absent class members.177 So long as absent class members are given 
notice and the opportunity to opt out, and are at all times adequately repre-
sented by the named plaintiff (and lawyer) for the class, it does not matter that 
they have no minimum contacts with the forum state or that their claims 
against the defendant arose elsewhere.178 The state court has the power to 
adjudicate plaintiff class members’ rights and dispose of their claims. 
For that reason, Shutts has been widely viewed as an enabling decision 
for multistate class actions.179 And since it was decided in 1985, countless 
nationwide and multistate class actions have been filed, certified, and re-
solved in state courts. Indeed, nationwide class actions in state court be-
came a favorite tool of forum shopping plaintiffs because it only takes one 
anomalous state court to certify a questionable class for the plaintiffs to be 
able to threaten the defendant with a massive judgment. This is the problem 
at which CAFA was ostensibly aimed—removing nationwide class actions 
to federal court to avoid certification in anomalous state courts.180 
Bristol-Myers does not overrule Shutts; indeed, it barely engages 
Shutts.181 But, as the Bristol-Myers plaintiffs argued, it is difficult to square 
the result in Bristol-Myers with the type of nationwide class action that 
Shutts enabled. The difficulty lies, not in personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident class members—the particular question Shutts addressed—but in 
jurisdiction over the defendant to adjudicate nonresident class members’ 
claims. 
Shutts involved a class of 28,000 gas-lease royalty owners from all fif-
ty states who brought suit in Kansas state court against Phillips Petroleum, a 
Delaware corporation headquartered in Oklahoma.182 The plaintiff class 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814 (1985). 
 178 Id.  
 179 See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the Na-
tional Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1320–21, 1323 (2005); 
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 180 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 22–25. 
 181 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 n.4 (2017) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court today does not confront the question whether its opinion here 
would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent 
a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there.”). 
 182 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. 
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sought to recover unpaid interest on royalty payments that they were due 
from gas leases operated by Phillips Petroleum in eleven states. Less than 
0.25% of those leases were in Kansas, less than 4% of the class members 
were Kansas residents, and, although Shutts was a Kansas resident, none of 
the named plaintiffs owned leases in Kansas. The largest group of plaintiffs 
was, as in Bristol-Myers, from Texas.183  
Interestingly, it was the defendant that objected to the Kansas court’s 
personal jurisdiction over absent class members, not the class members 
themselves. Phillips Petroleum had standing to raise this argument, the Su-
preme Court held, because a class action judgment might subject it to one-
way preclusion: Absent class members who later successfully challenged 
the Kansas court’s personal jurisdiction would be free to sue Phillips Petro-
leum in another court, whereas Phillips Petroleum would be bound by res 
judicata. Phillips Petroleum’s argument that Kansas lacked jurisdiction over 
absent class members unless they affirmatively opted into the class action 
failed to persuade the Court.184 But Phillips Petroleum made no argument 
that the Kansas court lacked jurisdiction over itself, even with respect to 
claims by plaintiffs with no connection to Kansas. Likely because they were 
operating under the more expansive understanding of general jurisdiction 
before Goodyear, no one involved seemed to question the court’s jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.185 Indeed, it would have been exceedingly odd for 
Phillips Petroleum to have made the derivative challenge to the Kansas 
court’s personal jurisdiction over the absent class members if personal ju-
risdiction over itself was seriously questioned. 
Yet after Bristol-Myers, it is difficult to see how the Kansas court 
could have had personal jurisdiction over Phillips Petroleum for the vast 
majority of the class members’ claims. Under Goodyear and Daimler, it is 
clear that Kansas did not have general jurisdiction over Phillips Petroleum. 
Although Phillips Petroleum “own[ed] property and conduct[ed] substantial 
business in the State,” it was not at home there, and “only a few leases in 
issue [were] located in Kansas.”186 And under Bristol-Myers, it is hard to 
see how Kansas could have had specific jurisdiction over the defendant 
with respect to most of the class members’ claims. The claims of Texas (or 
Oklahoma, or any other state for that matter) royalty owners for interest due 
on Texas gas leases did not “arise out of or relate to” Phillips Petroleum’s 
operations in Kansas. There was no “connection between the forum and the 
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specific claims at issue”;187 nothing happened to the Texas class members in 
Kansas. And the fact that the Texas class members’ claims were materially 
identical to the claims of hundreds of Kansas plaintiffs suing over Kansas 
gas leases doesn’t seem to matter under the logic of Bristol-Myers.188 
In short, if the exercise of specific jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers re-
quires a connection between each plaintiff’s claim and the forum state, then 
it is hard to see how a state court other than the defendant’s home state 
could have specific jurisdiction over most multistate class actions. There 
may be some cases where all of the conduct that causes the class members’ 
injuries nationwide occurred in a single state that is not the defendant’s 
“home” under Goodyear and Daimler (perhaps a state where the defendant 
has its manufacturing operations or conducted critical research or clinical 
trials), and thus that state would have specific jurisdiction over all of the 
class members’ claims. Under Bristol-Myers, it would seem that, except in 
these sorts of circumstances, a multistate or nationwide class action may 
only be maintained in a state that can exercise general jurisdiction over the 
defendant—or in a state where the defendant consents. 
The Court did not expressly decide the fate of multistate class actions 
in Bristol-Myers. Justice Alito distinguished Shutts by saying that “the au-
thority of a State to entertain the claims of nonresident class members is 
entirely different from its authority to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant. Since Shutts concerned the due process rights of plaintiffs, 
it has no bearing on the question presented here.”189 And he stressed that the 
defendant in Shutts “did not assert that Kansas improperly exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction over it.”190 Having declined to address the question, the 
Court could, in a future case, carve class actions out from the rule in Bris-
tol-Myers by treating the class more as an entity than as an aggregation of 
individual claims.191 The Supreme Court has, in the past, treated absent 
class members as parties for some purposes, but not for others.192 The door 
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remains open for the Court to look only to the named plaintiffs’ claims 
when assessing the connection between the litigation and the forum state, 
much like it ignores absent class members and looks only to the citizenship 
of the named plaintiffs for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 
§ 1332(a).193 But, given recent trends in personal jurisdiction,194 subject 
matter jurisdiction,195 and class action law,196 we would not bet on it, at 
least in the mass-tort context.197 
Would multistate class actions fare any better in federal court? The Su-
preme Court in Bristol-Myers expressly left “open the question whether the 
Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a federal court.”198 Although there may be no constitutional 
problem with a federal court exercising personal jurisdiction over a multi-
state class action challenging a nationwide course of conduct, we do not 
think that paves the way for multistate class actions in federal court outside 
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of the defendant’s home state—at least without further action from Con-
gress or the Advisory Committee. 
The federal courts are, of course, courts of a different sovereign than 
the state courts.199 And every plaintiff’s claim in a nationwide class could 
have a connection to the United States as a whole, even if they did not all 
have a sufficient connection to a single state.200 So a nationwide class action 
could be constitutionally feasible in federal court, even if the Fifth Amend-
ment imposes the same relatedness requirement on federal courts that Bris-
tol-Myers read into the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts—a question 
the Court left open in Bristol-Myers.201 
But even if there would be no constitutional problem with federal 
courts exercising specific jurisdiction over a nationwide class action, Rule 
4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ties the personal jurisdiction of 
the federal courts to the jurisdictional reach of the states in which they sit.202 
In other words, except in cases where Congress says otherwise, Rule 4(k) 
applies the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitation on state courts’ personal 
jurisdiction to the federal courts.203 And those limitations now include the 
relatedness requirements of Bristol-Myers. Perhaps Congress could expand 
the federal court’s personal jurisdiction over multistate class actions by 
passing a nationwide service of process statute for class actions, but it has 
not done so yet.204 So in federal court, as in state court, if plaintiffs want to 
bring a multistate class action, most of the time they will likely have to do 
so in a forum that has general jurisdiction over the defendant or where the 
defendant consents. 
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After Bristol-Myers, plaintiffs could probably still bring smaller, sin-
gle-state class actions outside of the defendant’s home forum, if all of the 
class members’ claims were sufficiently connected to the forum state. So, 
for example, if all of the class members were injured by the defendant’s 
conduct in the forum state, that state would likely have specific jurisdiction 
over the class action under Bristol-Myers. The same is probably true if all 
class members are residents of the forum state—though the Court was non-
committal on that point in Bristol-Myers.205 But even if plaintiffs could 
maintain a single-state class action outside of the defendant’s home state, 
the defendant will usually be able to remove class actions of any signifi-
cance to federal court, as federal jurisdiction would be appropriate either 
under § 1332(a) or under CAFA. 
Bristol-Myers thus continues the trend evident in CAFA towards feder-
alization of mass litigation. In fact, Bristol-Myers may render CAFA obso-
lete as a practical matter in many of the circumstances that CAFA was in-
tended to address. CAFA aimed primarily to prevent plaintiffs from obtain-
ing certification of nationwide class actions in particularly friendly state 
courts, thereby allowing a single outlier court to determine liability on a 
nationwide scale. CAFA ensured that these sorts of class actions would be 
removable to federal courts, where class certification standards are more 
uniform, and (at least perceived to be) more difficult to meet.206 After Bris-
tol-Myers, however, the central problem that CAFA aimed to solve no long-
er exists. Multistate class actions outside of the defendant’s home state are 
largely a thing of the past. CAFA is relegated primarily to mopping up sin-
gle-state class actions that join a nondiverse defendant and allowing 
hometown defendants to remove multistate class actions filed in states 
where they are subject to general jurisdiction.207 
The upshot, if our analysis is correct, is that nearly all nationwide or 
multistate class actions will end up in federal court in the defendant’s home 
state or states where it is subject to general jurisdiction (unless the defend-
ant has engaged in conduct directed nationwide in another state or consents 
to personal jurisdiction elsewhere). Single-state class actions might still be 
viable in other states, but will almost always be removable to federal court 
as a matter of ordinary diversity jurisdiction or under CAFA. 
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At least that’s the case for litigated class actions. Settlement class ac-
tions are a different matter. Because defendants can consent to personal ju-
risdiction in any state, the collusive practice known as a “reverse auction,” 
where the defendant essentially shops a class action settlement around to 
the lowest bidder, is still possible.208 As a rule, defendants hate aggregation 
until the time comes to settle, and then they want as much aggregation as 
they can get. A class action settlement binds all class members who do not 
opt out and thus precludes them from bringing their claims in any other 
court, forming a valuable shield for defendants from future liability.209 Rec-
ognizing the peace that a class action settlement can provide and knowing 
that there are multiple plaintiffs’ lawyers out there who would be delighted 
to serve as class counsel, the defendant can strike a deal with the lawyer 
willing to take the smallest sum for the largest class and then shop around 
for a state court willing to certify the class and approve the settlement (even 
if a federal court in its home state would not have).210 The implicit bargain, 
of course, is that class counsel will collect a hefty fee award for little work 
and the defendant maximizes the preclusive effect of the class action set-
tlement on the cheap. 
Bristol-Myers’s constriction of specific jurisdiction and the resulting 
limits on plaintiff-side forum shopping thus does little to limit the ability of 
the defendant and class counsel to shop for a forum that will approve their 
collusion at the expense of absent class members. Defendants are not lim-
ited to settling class actions in their home states because they can consent to 
personal jurisdiction in any state.211 But under Shutts, absent class members 
will be deemed to have consented to the personal jurisdiction of the defend-
ant and class counsel’s handpicked state court, unless they opt out.212 Class 
action settlements in state court are binding on class members and will have 
preclusive effect in all other courts, state and federal, even if they resolved 
claims that could never have been litigated there because the defendant 
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would have objected to personal jurisdiction or some of the claims are be-
yond the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction.213 
The combination of Bristol-Myers and Shutts thus creates an asym-
metry in opportunities for forum shopping that may come at the expense of 
absent class members. Further, CAFA does not permit absent class members 
to intervene and remove the case to federal court to short circuit this sort of 
settlement forum shopping.214 Savvy class action lawyers might file in fed-
eral court to begin with, where competing class actions can be consolidated 
in an MDL. They might then ask the federal judge to enjoin competing state 
court class actions as a way to fend off competitors who might try to under-
cut them in a reverse auction. But federal courts can only enjoin ongoing 
state court proceedings if they can fit the request into an exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act.215 And if the defendant reaches a collusive settlement 
with the federal class action lawyer before certification, at least some courts 
will allow them to voluntarily dismiss the federal action and refile in a more 
pliable state court where the defendant can consent to jurisdiction.216 
Going forward, Bristol-Myers will result in class action aggregation on 
defendants’ terms. Defendants will be able to dictate the states in which 
they can be sued in multistate class actions by where they choose to incor-
porate and locate their operations. They can choose between federal and 
state courts under CAFA. And defendants will still have the option of set-
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 214 See Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Hermann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived 
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ville, Louisiana, . . . restructured their deal, and submitted it to the Louisiana court, 
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Gen. Motors, 134 F.3d at 137. 
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tling class actions in any state court, so long as they can find a willing part-
ner in class counsel. 
B. Mass Joinder in State Courts 
Bristol-Myers effectively spells the end for mass joinder of claims by 
plaintiffs from multiple states in most state courts outside of the defendant’s 
home state. In other words, the plaintiffs’ strategy in Bristol-Myers is out. 
Plaintiffs cannot engage in large-scale multistate aggregation in the state 
courts of their choice just because some of them reside in or were injured in 
that state. If they want to aggregate claims of plaintiffs from around the 
country in state court, they will have to do so on defendants’ terms.  They 
can sue in a state where the defendant has chosen to incorporate or locate its 
principal place of business or, if there is a single state where the defendant 
engaged in conduct that gave rise to all of the plaintiffs’ claims nationwide, 
in the state where the defendant chose to engage in that conduct. 
Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor points out in her dissent, there may be no 
state in which plaintiffs from around the country can aggregate their claims 
against two or more defendants who are incorporated and have their princi-
pal places of business in different states, as no single state would have gen-
eral jurisdiction over both defendants.217 Similarly, it may be impossible for 
plaintiffs from different states to join together to sue a foreign defendant in 
any state court, as a defendant not headquartered or incorporated in the 
United States is not at home in any state.218 
Of course, Bristol-Myers does not mean the end of mass-tort litigation 
in state courts. There are still several avenues available for individuals or 
groups of plaintiffs to remain in state court. And plaintiffs or their lawyers 
might prefer these options to federal MDL under certain circumstances. 
Bristol-Myers leaves open the possibility of multistate aggregation in a 
state where the defendant engaged in conduct directed nationwide, even if 
the defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction there. In Bristol-Myers, 
the defendant had not engaged in any California conduct sufficiently linked 
to the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims.219 But suppose Bristol-Myers had de-
signed or manufactured the drug there. Under those circumstances, one 
could imagine that there might be specific jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers 
for a nationwide set of claims, regardless of the residences of the plaintiffs 
or the locations of their injuries. But even if the plaintiffs were able to struc-
ture such an action to avoid removal to federal court (by, for example, join-
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 219 Id. at 1781–82 (majority opinion). 
1292 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1251 
ing nondiverse parties and breaking their actions up to avoid CAFA’s mass 
action provisions), the aggregation would be more on defendants’ terms 
than the options open before Bristol-Myers. The defendants still possessed 
the opportunity to preemptively designate the forum as a potential place 
where it might be sued. That is, going forward, defendants can choose to 
engage in conduct directed nationwide in states where they deem the risk of 
suit on claims relating to that conduct acceptable—a sort of ex ante forum 
shopping. 
Plaintiffs can, of course, still sue individually in the states where they 
suffered injury; those states will have specific jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs’ claims so long as the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the 
state’s markets.220 The Court in Bristol-Myers did not adopt the defendant’s 
argument that specific jurisdiction requires the defendant’s purposeful con-
tacts with the forum state to have proximately caused the plaintiff’s inju-
ry.221 So presumably plaintiffs can still sue in the states where they live and 
were injured, even if the particular product that injured them was purchased 
out of state (though the Court does not say so definitively).222 Suing indi-
vidually, however, may be cost prohibitive in many mass-tort cases, where 
expensive expert testimony is often a prerequisite to any hope of recovery. 
Indeed, Bristol-Myers candidly admitted that it anticipated that if plaintiffs 
had to file individually, “a lot of those cases aren’t going to get filed.”223 
Smaller groups of plaintiffs who reside or were injured in a single state 
can, the Court lets on, “probably sue together,” as that state would likely 
have specific jurisdiction over all of their claims.224 And some plaintiffs’ 
lawyers may prefer the independence of controlling their own small-group 
litigation to joining a nationwide aggregation. But by suing in small groups, 
plaintiffs give up the leverage and economies of scale that come with na-
tionwide aggregation. And most of the time, the nonresident defendant will 
be able to remove those single-state aggregations to federal court and have 
them transferred under § 1407 to an MDL, if one is pending (and it will be 
in a mass tort of any significant size).225 
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Plaintiffs might be able to keep their individual or small-group claims 
in state court if they are able to join a local defendant—like the distributor, 
McKesson, in Bristol-Myers.226 Likewise, if they could recruit a plaintiff 
who was a citizen of the same state as the defendant, but was injured in the 
forum state or had some other sufficiently close connection to the forum 
state to make specific jurisdiction proper under Bristol-Myers, they might 
be able to frustrate removal. But such options are no way to organize mass 
litigation on a national scale. Aside from the added cost of such procedural 
maneuvering, the plaintiffs’ ability to resist removal depends on the fortuity 
of being able to properly join an in-state defendant or recruit a nondiverse 
co-plaintiff. And the doctrine against fraudulent joinder—which Congress is 
considering strengthening—will prevent plaintiffs from getting too adven-
turesome.227 
Finally, there may be times when plaintiffs will find aggregation in the 
defendant’s home state appealing. Most obviously, the defendant may have 
chosen to incorporate or locate its principal place of business in a relatively 
plaintiff-friendly state. Litigation risk is not always the dominant considera-
tion in choosing a principal place of business; labor markets, access to re-
sources, the location of the CEO’s summerhouse, or any number of other 
considerations might be more important. Corporations that have elected to 
base themselves in California come to mind.228 And even when defendants 
have engaged in a bit of preemptive forum shopping, some plaintiffs may 
nevertheless decide to accept the defendant’s home-field advantage and file 
there anyway in order to avoid a federal MDL—perhaps because of the 
identity of the transferee judge or the leadership of the plaintiffs’ steering 
committee. Every litigation presents a unique set of challenges that require 
strategic tradeoffs, and under some circumstances one such tradeoff may be 
to decide to venture into unfriendly territory. 
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But much of the time, the defendant’s home state may be very un-
friendly territory.229 The types of corporations that find themselves as mass-
tort defendants—Big Tobacco, Big Pharma, Big Anything—are often major 
political and social players in their home states. Even if they did not choose 
their headquarters to minimize litigation risk, they may have powerful lob-
bies in the state legislature and, over time, may seek protective substantive 
or procedural legislation and work to help shape the (often elected) state 
judiciary. Similarly, local jurors may not be eager to put a major local em-
ployer and economic engine out of business. None of this is meant to sug-
gest that state courts in the defendant’s home state cannot be fair or are in 
the defendant’s pocket. But, to the extent that forum matters in litigation—
and both sides think it matters quite a bit—there are reasons to believe that 
plaintiffs will often prefer to avoid the defendant’s home state. 
In short, some plaintiffs in large states where they can join a non-
diverse defendant may still find it economical to aggregate on a single-state 
basis. And some plaintiffs might be content to sue the defendant in its home 
state. But, bigger picture, the result will be what Bristol-Myers candidly 
admitted that it hoped for in the California Court of Appeals.230 Many plain-
tiffs who cannot join a nationwide mass litigation in state court will either 
find it cost prohibitive to sue on their own in the state where they were in-
jured or will find themselves swept up into the federal MDL. Given that the 
alternative is to litigate on the defendant’s home turf, many plaintiffs will 
prefer to take their chances in the federal MDL. Bristol-Myers thus contin-
ues what CAFA began: moving mass-tort aggregation to federal court. 
C. MDL as the Likely Alternative 
If our reading of Bristol-Myers is correct, much of the mass-tort litiga-
tion that has previously been aggregated in state courts is likely to end up in 
MDL. Unless plaintiffs want to litigate alone or on the defendant’s home 
turf, they will file in (or allow their claims to be removed to) federal court 
in their home states or the states where they were injured, and those cases 
will then be consolidated under § 1407 in an MDL. Given these options, 
plaintiffs may not even try to avoid federal jurisdiction by joining non-
diverse defendants or structuring their claims to circumvent CAFA. Plain-
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tiffs might even file directly in the federal MDL court if the defendant con-
sents to such an arrangement (as many do).231 
That MDL would become the primary destination for mass-tort litiga-
tion would not come as a surprise to those who developed the statute and 
saw their creation as the antidote to the “litigation explosion.”232 The only 
surprise would be that it took so long to get to this point. But with class ac-
tions no longer a viable or attractive option and state-court aggregations 
severely limited by Bristol-Myers, MDL will often be the only realistic 
means left to aggregate tort claims arising around the country in a single 
courtroom. Although plaintiffs might have preferred class or nonclass ag-
gregation in state court (and defendants might have preferred no aggrega-
tion at all), MDL has emerged as the best available alternative—for plain-
tiffs, defendants, and the courts. For plaintiffs, MDL offers the advantages 
of aggregation: streamlined proceedings, cost sharing, and, for lead lawyers, 
additional common-benefit fees.233 For defendants, MDL offers litigation in 
a single forum and the possibility of global peace without the risk of a 
classwide verdict.234 And, of course, for the courts there is the efficiency of 
litigation being handled by a single judge rather than over and over again 
throughout the country.235 
But why, after Bristol-Myers, is it feasible to consolidate nationwide 
litigation in the MDL court? One might think that because Rule 4 makes the 
federal courts’ personal jurisdiction the same as the states in which they sit, 
the limitations on specific jurisdiction imposed by Bristol-Myers would 
hinder MDL just as it will hinder state courts.236 After all, if personal juris-
diction now stands as an often insuperable obstacle to consolidating na-
tionwide litigation in a class action or mass joinder outside the defendant’s 
home state, why would the same obstacle not stand in the way of putting 
exactly the same set of claims into an MDL, which, under the statute, can 
be located anywhere in the country? The answer is in the magic of how 
MDL is built. 
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MDL is characterized by an inherent split personality. While it acts as 
a powerful aggregating force from which parties cannot escape and within 
which individual litigants have limited control over their cases, formally 
MDL preserves the individual nature of the transferred cases that are con-
solidated within it.237 Each plaintiff has retained a lawyer, each case is sepa-
rately filed and docketed, and at the end of pretrial proceedings (if that time 
ever comes) each case will be sent back to the court in which it was origi-
nally filed for trial.238 
Because—formally at least—transfer to the MDL court is limited to 
pretrial proceedings, the JPML has held that MDL is “simply not encum-
bered by considerations of in personam jurisdiction and venue.”239 Instead, 
it is the jurisdiction of the transferor court that matters. So long as the cases 
were originally filed in (or removed to) a district court that has personal 
jurisdiction under Rule 4 (and thus Bristol-Myers), the MDL transferee 
court does not need an independent basis for personal jurisdiction over the 
temporarily transferred cases.240 
And that is exactly what the drafters of the MDL statute intended. One 
of the prime motivations for inventing MDL was that the general transfer 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, allowed transfers only to districts in which cases 
might have originally been brought—that is, districts that were both proper 
venues and had jurisdiction. Because the drafters of the MDL statute envi-
sioned nationwide consolidation, they understood that there would rarely be 
a single district that would qualify under the venue statute.241 So they wrote 
the statute to provide for pretrial consolidation in any federal district so long 
as “such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses 
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”242 And, in 
practice, the JPML does not consider personal jurisdiction in choosing the 
MDL transferee court for a nationwide mass tort; when the claims are dis-
persed throughout the country virtually any district will do.243 
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Of course, the idea that an MDL transfer is somehow temporary and 
limited is little more than a fiction. During the consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings, the MDL court has all of the powers of the transferor court, in-
cluding the power to grant dispositive motions.244 And the practical reality 
is that cases rarely return to the transferor court. Essentially, MDL masquer-
ades as a temporary consolidation of individual cases that were filed in 
courts with proper personal jurisdiction and venue for the limited purpose 
of managing pretrial proceedings. Never mind that nothing important ever 
happens in those courts. Pretrial proceedings are where all the action is. 
Nevertheless, this fiction of limited transfer allows MDL to get around the 
limits that Rule 4 places on a federal court’s personal jurisdiction over a 
class action or mass joinder. 
But what about the Constitution? A federal MDL is in the courts of the 
United States, so the relevant question is not whether all of the claims are 
sufficiently related to any particular state to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process as interpreted by Bristol-Myers. Rather, the question is wheth-
er the unique kind of consolidation in an MDL is an acceptable exercise of 
federal power under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We 
believe the answer is yes, and the handful of federal courts that have so far 
addressed the question agree with us, though they have not yet settled on a 
compelling reason for why that is.245 
The federal courts’ territorial sovereignty is presumably much broader 
than that of any individual state; it covers the entire nation.246 And it should 
not be difficult to find a connection between a nationwide set of claims and 
the United States, assuming that the rule in Bristol-Myers applies to the 
Fifth Amendment as well. Thus, several courts have held that personal ju-
risdiction poses no obstacle to the JPML consolidating all claims around the 
country in a single federal district.247 In these courts’ view, § 1407 operates 
like a statute that provides for nationwide service of process, such as inter-
pleader or the Securities Act.248 
                                                                                                                           
scope, and thus almost any district would be an appropriate forum.”); In re Actos Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1356–57 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (choosing the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana when “allegations in this nationwide litigation do not have a strong 
connection to any particular district, and related actions are pending in numerous districts across 
the country”). 
 244 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b). 
 245 This question is discussed in greater detail in Bradt, Long Arm, supra note 29, at 1213–14. 
 246 Cf. Nicastro, 564 U.S at 884. 
 247 Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Agent 
Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 248 Howard, 382 F. App’x at 442 (referring to the MDL statute as providing for “nationwide 
service of process”). 
1298 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1251 
But this analysis has several problems. First, the Court has never ex-
plicitly authorized nationwide service of process, though it has not ruled it 
out either.249 Second, as the Court has reiterated on several other occasions, 
including last term in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, when Congress wishes 
to provide for nationwide service of process, it must do so clearly in the 
relevant statute because “a basis for service of a summons on the defendant 
is prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”250 The MDL statute 
has no such provision for nationwide service of process. That is why, absent 
consent by the defendant, a plaintiff may not simply file a case directly into 
an MDL unless the MDL district has jurisdiction.251 The plaintiff—as 
acknowledged by the JPML—must file in (or the defendant must remove 
to) an appropriate federal district under Rule 4, after which the case must be 
transferred into the MDL.252 Finally, to say that Congress intended that the 
MDL statute authorize a sort of nationwide jurisdiction only begs the ques-
tion of whether doing so complies with the Fifth Amendment.253 
Whether the Fifth Amendment permits the MDL scheme is an open 
question, though perhaps the Court’s acknowledgment in Bristol-Myers that 
due process may work differently under the Fifth Amendment than the 
Fourteenth Amendment signals a receptiveness to MDL.254 Currently, the 
MDL court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the cases consolidated 
before it seems to depend on some combination of the fiction of limited 
transfer and the broad territorial reach of the national sovereign. The better 
argument for jurisdiction in MDL, in our view, is based on recognition of 
the national interest in efficient dispute resolution, balanced against a rea-
sonable opportunity to be heard in the MDL forum.255 That is, the benefits 
of MDL on all sides will typically outweigh the costs in terms of centraliz-
ing nationwide litigation in a single geographic location. 
This analysis suggests, however, that the Fifth Amendment imposes 
some limitations on where an MDL can be located to ensure that the parties 
have a reasonable opportunity to be heard. It might be fundamentally unfair, 
for instance, for the JPML to locate an MDL involving a Florida defendant 
being sued by plaintiffs throughout the southeast in, say, the District of 
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Alaska.256 Or it might be fundamentally unfair to force plaintiffs to litigate 
far from home when the argument for consent is so thin. After all, the plain-
tiffs may have filed their cases in appropriate state courts, and the defendant 
may have removed them and successfully sought transfer to an MDL locat-
ed far across the country. In that sense, MDL plaintiffs are even worse off 
than absent class members under Shutts, who could at least opt out and go it 
alone in the forum of their choice.257 MDL plaintiffs are stuck in the MDL 
forum until the MDL judge determines that pretrial proceedings are over 
and lets them go. MDL must therefore be structured in a manner that will 
ensure that plaintiffs from around the country can effectively participate in 
the litigation. 
In any event, our intent is not to assess whether MDL passes constitu-
tional muster—a distinct question beyond the scope of our argument 
here.258 What is more important for our purposes is that courts have not yet 
been troubled by questions of personal jurisdiction in MDL, despite its 
somewhat tenuous relationship to the underpinnings of jurisdictional doc-
trine. This is because the magic of MDL lies in its ability to facilitate aggre-
gation without offending otherwise applicable litigation norms. MDL’s abil-
ity to accommodate traditional norms of individual litigation has been the 
key to its success. In other words, because MDL can be shoehorned into the 
doctrinal limitations on individual lawsuits, it avoids the underlying, and 
more difficult, theoretical questions. The ease with which MDL facilitates 
nationwide aggregation while accommodating the jurisdictional limits of 
our federal system has allowed it to fulfill its destiny. Bristol-Myers only 
furthers that trend. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MDL’S ASCENDANCY 
After Bristol-Myers, if plaintiffs want to aggregate a nationwide set of 
claims, they will likely have to do so on the defendant’s terms—either in a 
state where the defendant has chosen to base its operations or a federal 
MDL. If our prediction is correct that most plaintiffs will prefer MDL, the 
result will be increased federalization of mass-tort litigation. Some fifty 
years after its passage, the MDL statute’s architects’ vision will have come 
to fruition: nationwide disputes—even those involving state-law claims—
will be handled together in national courts. 
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This federalization of mass-tort litigation is not just a story about 
MDL; it is part of a broader trend toward federalization of disputes arising 
out of national economic activity. Most obviously, Congress has been ex-
panding federal regulation over the national economy ever since the New 
Deal.259 But, as Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey point out, trends 
toward federalization have played out more subtly across a number of doc-
trines.260 Preemption displaces state-law claims with federal law.261 The 
Supreme Court’s punitive damages decisions impose federal constitutional 
limits on state-law remedies.262 Expansive views of federal question juris-
diction transform some state-law claims with federal ingredients into feder-
al claims, while supplemental jurisdiction sweeps other state-law claims 
into federal court.263 Even the Supreme Court’s recent Federal Arbitration 
Act jurisprudence moves state-law cases out of state court and into arbitra-
tion, which is ultimately overseen by the federal courts.264 
And, of course, CAFA moved state-law class actions of national scope 
into federal courts.265 By making nationwide aggregation in state courts im-
practicable, except in the states that plaintiffs find least desirable, Bristol-
Myers continues the trend towards federalization of aggregate litigation. If 
we are correct that Bristol-Myers means that far more mass-tort litigation 
will be consolidated in federal MDL, this development raises two questions: 
does federal MDL fit within our inherited notions of federalism, and what 
should we think of MDL’s dominance as a normative matter? 
A. How MDL Facilitates Federalization of State-Law Claims 
Consolidation of a mass tort in MDL presents attractive opportunities 
to plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts. Most importantly, federal MDL of-
fers the possibility of a complete resolution of all related claims. Although 
all sides may prefer other alternatives—defendants may prefer no aggrega-
                                                                                                                           
 259 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (allowing regulation of intrastate posses-
sion of marijuana); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (permitting regulation of home-
grown wheat not intended for sale). 
 260 Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 30, at 1356–57. 
 261 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 (1992) (holding that state law 
personal injury claims were not preempted by federally mandated warnings about smoking). 
 262 E.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003); BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 
(1996). 
 263 E.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S 546, 549 (2005); Grable & 
Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005). 
 264 See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2017); AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011). 
 265 See Purcell, CAFA, supra note 69, at 1921 (“CAFA accelerated the growing centralization 
of American law.”). 
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tion at all and plaintiffs may prefer the leverage that comes with class certi-
fication—MDL may be a middle ground on which all sides begrudgingly 
agree.266 That plaintiffs and defendants gravitate toward MDL as the best 
available option for handling and resolving mass litigation, however, is not 
sufficient for its success. After all, both plaintiffs and defendants favored the 
class-action settlements that the Supreme Court invalidated in Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.267 For MDL to work it 
must also sufficiently “fit” with norms of due process and federalism, which 
developed in the context of one-on-one litigation. MDL thrives because it can 
facilitate aggregation while maintaining fidelity to those norms, at least on 
the surface. Perhaps ironically, MDL may simultaneously undermine those 
norms in subtle but profound ways. But that is the magic of MDL. In a very 
real sense, MDL “works” because it allows for aggregation, where CAFA 
“failed” because it causes most class actions to be dismissed.268 
Bristol-Myers—and its interaction with choice of law—is a superb il-
lustration of this dynamic. As discussed above, Bristol-Myers opened a new 
avenue for contesting personal jurisdiction. Rather than focus on the burden 
on the defendant or the unpredictability of litigating in the forum, Bristol-
Myers’s candid position throughout the litigation was that aggregation of 
the nationwide set of claims in California was unconstitutionally unfair be-
cause California’s courts would be too friendly to the plaintiffs.269 Indeed, a 
primary reason why the California Court of Appeals rejected Bristol-
Myers’s position was that it did not consider the company’s interest in 
avoiding a plaintiff-friendly forum to be one recognized or protected by 
personal jurisdiction doctrine.270 
The U.S. Supreme Court obviously came to a different conclusion, but 
it had a difficult time justifying why it would be better for the cases to be 
dispersed in state courts around the country rather than consolidated in Cali-
fornia. The Court did not seem to think that the burden on Bristol-Myers of 
                                                                                                                           
 266 See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (framing MDL as the middle ground for plaintiffs and defendants); Mul-
lenix, Death of Democratic, supra note 21, at 552 (characterizing MDL as the preferred means for 
settling huge liabilities). 
 267 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 825 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997). 
 268 CAFA, of course, was designed to fail, and MDL was designed to succeed—albeit by two 
different sets of statutory drafters with very different purposes. See Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra 
note 22, at 913; Burbank, Historical Context, supra note 10, at 1517. 
 269 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 15 (arguing that plaintiffs chose Cali-
fornia because it was “jurisdictionally advantageous for them, either procedurally or substantive-
ly”). 
 270 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 436 n.20 (Ct. App. 
2014). 
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litigating in California was great.271 And even assuming that interstate fed-
eralism may act as an independent limitation on a state court’s jurisdiction, 
the Court never explained why California’s exercise of jurisdiction was of-
fensive or which sister states could have rightly taken offense.272 
Perhaps one reason for this confusion is that Bristol-Myers sounded 
more like it was arguing in favor of federal diversity jurisdiction than for 
limitations on personal jurisdiction. The assumption underlying Bristol-
Myers’s position is that California judges cannot be presumed to treat an 
out-of-state defendant like Bristol-Myers fairly. As a result, although Bris-
tol-Myers must accept litigating in California courts when it comes to inju-
ries to Californians, to require it to face litigation there arising from injuries 
to residents of other states is unfair. Such an argument hews more closely to 
the traditional justification for including diversity jurisdiction in Article III, 
namely, that state courts cannot be trusted to treat out-of-staters even-
handedly.273 Here, of course, the argument is deployed in service of dis-
missing claims against Bristol-Myers brought by fellow out-of-staters, but 
the concern seems to be that California’s bias either extends to all plaintiffs, 
or that its preference for its own citizens will spill over onto an out-of-state 
corporation. The subtext of Bristol-Myers’s position is that if it faces a na-
tionwide set of claims, only the judges of its home state or a federal judge 
overseeing an MDL can be presumed to treat Bristol-Myers fairly. The Su-
preme Court apparently agreed. 
Imposing these diversity-esque arguments on the personal jurisdiction 
framework makes for an odd fit. The Court suggests that a reason why Cali-
fornia may not hear the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims is that doing so would 
interfere with the prerogatives of sister states.274 Although the Court does 
not elaborate, one might argue that California simply has an insufficient 
interest in adjudicating those claims, and to do so in the face of stronger 
interests of other states would be imperialistic. Nevertheless, despite the 
                                                                                                                           
 271 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (emphasiz-
ing the federalism interest, while at the same time deemphasizing the inconvenience of litigating 
in a distant forum). 
 272 See id. (declining to address which other states retained an interest in the litigation). 
 273 See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (Marshall, J.) (accept-
ing the argument that diversity jurisdiction guards against prejudice in the state courts); THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying the need for federal courts and their power to 
hear diversity jurisdiction cases); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 
41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 492 (1928) (exploring the historical reasons for assigning diversity juris-
diction cases to the federal courts). 
 274 Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81. Indeed, at oral argument, Justice Gorsuch was par-
ticularly concerned about this point, asking Bristol Myers’s counsel “what implications there are 
for the interests, say, of Ohio in administering its own procedures with respect to its own citizens 
for torts that occur in its own State.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 25. 
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Court’s apparent concern for horizontal federalism, it implicitly endorses 
nationwide aggregation in the federal courts through MDL. The Court is not 
worried about the vertical-federalism implications of its decision. To put it 
bluntly, the Court is quite concerned about California taking cases that 
should rightfully be decided by other states, but it is wholly unconcerned 
about those cases being decided by a single federal court in MDL, whether 
it is located in California or anywhere else. 
The Court’s conclusion in this regard echoes the non-cynical rationale 
for CAFA—that federalization of nationwide or multistate class actions is 
appropriate for cases of national scope.275 And, indeed, there are legitimate 
and compelling arguments that the courts of a single state should not govern 
the nation and that the national interest in efficient adjudication is appropri-
ately effectuated by federal jurisdiction. 
Of course, the cynical reading of CAFA is that Congress intended to 
shift nationwide class actions into federal courts, where they would be dead 
on arrival because the questions of fact and law common to the class would 
never predominate.276 Under the rule of Klaxon v. Stentor, a federal court to 
which a class action is removed under CAFA must apply the choice-of-law 
rules of the state in which it sits.277 If that state’s rules dictate that different 
substantive law must be applied to different plaintiffs within the class, then 
under the dominant view of Rule 23(b)(3), the disparate questions of law 
overwhelm the common ones. As a result, class actions based on state law 
removed to federal court are unlikely to be certified unless the federal court 
can find some way to massage the choice-of-law analysis to dictate the ap-
plication of a uniform substantive law.278 In fact, that was one reason CAFA 
was thought to be devastating for plaintiffs.279 
                                                                                                                           
 275 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27; Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional 
Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (2008). 
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 277 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). 
 278 Silberman, supra note 70, at 2034; York-Erwin, supra note 71, at 1794. 
 279 Edward Purcell elaborates: 
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Purcell, CAFA, supra note 69, at 1925 (footnote omitted). 
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MDL, however, is not burdened by the limitations of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Judge Becker, the primary advocate for the MDL statute, fought vigorously 
against adding a predominance requirement sought by corporate defend-
ants, explicitly because he did not want to see individual questions of fact 
and law prevent the aggregation that he thought was necessary to counter 
the coming litigation explosion in mass torts. Even in 1967, Becker under-
stood that, in cases based on state law, different choice-of-law rules could 
prevent aggregation under any rule that required predominance.280 
Doctrinally, the lack of a predominance requirement means that the 
“fifty-state-law problem” that has plagued the mass-tort class action is no 
obstacle to aggregation in MDL. And because there is no requirement in 
MDL that the law applicable to all of the component cases be the same, 
there is no pressure to alter the choice-of-law rules that would otherwise 
apply in order to facilitate aggregation. Formally, MDL can leave undis-
turbed the law applicable to each individual case within the collective.281 
Perhaps more important than MDL’s ability to aggregate while ac-
commodating Klaxon doctrinally is its consistency with Klaxon’s underly-
ing theory of vertical federalism. This is the key to understanding how the 
Court in Bristol-Myers can assert an aggressive defense of personal jurisdic-
tion as a means of policing interstate federalism, while also ignoring the 
likely effect of its decision—that the cases will ultimately wind up out of 
state courts altogether and in federal MDLs. Bristol-Myers prevents states 
like California from infringing the prerogative of other states to decide cas-
es in which they have a greater interest or connection, but it facilitates ag-
gregation of those claims in a single federal district court. 
Klaxon, of course, is an early progeny of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins.282 The holding in Klaxon—that a federal court sitting in diversity must 
apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits—was thought to be 
a necessary corollary of Erie itself for two reasons articulated by Justice 
Reed in his opinion for a unanimous Court. First, if a federal court could 
apply its own independently determined choice-of-law rules, it would be a 
threat to the principle of intrastate vertical uniformity. If different choice-of-
law rules apply in federal and state courts, the courts might reach different 
outcomes solely because of the “accident of diversity.”283 Such a result 
                                                                                                                           
 280 Bradt, Less and More, supra note 43. 
 281 Bradt, Shortest Distance, supra note 231, at 793 (“MDL accommodates well both the 
Klaxon/Van Dusen framework and its underlying policies.”). 
 282 See id. at 769–77 (providing a detailed discussion of the history of Klaxon); see also Roo-
sevelt, supra note 74. 
 283 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
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would risk recreating the forum shopping that the Court rejected in Erie.284 
Central to Justice Brandeis’s thinking in Erie was the recognition that cor-
porations used removal to shop for attractive law in the business-friendly 
federal courts.285 Hence, the famous abuse in Black & White Taxicab & 
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., where a monopo-
list reincorporated in a neighboring state to create diversity because the fed-
eral courts would enforce its exclusive contract and enjoin its competitor 
when the state courts would not.286 If federal courts could choose to apply 
law different from that which would apply in state court, then the evils of 
Swift v. Tyson would be replicated.287 Second, the Court in Klaxon recog-
nized that a state’s choice-of-law rules are substantive law reflecting state 
policy. For federal courts to preempt those views, without direction from 
Congress, would be a threat to states’ prerogatives and an overreach remi-
niscent of the “general law.”288 
Klaxon, combined with Bristol-Myers and MDL, promotes a coherent 
idea of federalism, both horizontal and vertical. Bristol-Myers effectively 
eliminates aggregation of nationwide claims in states that would have only 
a tenuous interest in the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs. Those claims now 
must be filed in a state that would have a sufficient interest—whether that is 
a state with specific or general jurisdiction under the Court’s current 
framework. In theory, then, the state in which the case is filed will also have 
a sufficient interest in applying its choice-of-law rules (and potentially fo-
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 285 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and 
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Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different 
states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits 
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those 
of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by en-
forcing an independent ‘general law’ of conflict of laws. 
Id. 
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rum law where permissible) to the claims asserted. In that sense, Bristol-
Myers’s policing of forum shopping also serves to police law shopping in 
the vein that the Court has long followed. This is especially true in a world 
in which actually policing law shopping through constitutional limitations 
on choice of law has proven unworkable. 
As we have noted, however, most of these cases are likely not going to 
remain in state court. Instead, they will be removed and transferred into an 
MDL. But the MDL court is required to apply the choice-of-law rules of the 
state of the district court from which the case was transferred.289 As a result, 
MDL facilitates a nationwide aggregation while accommodating both the 
vertical uniformity demanded by Klaxon and Erie, and the horizontal feder-
alism of Bristol-Myers. MDL is, therefore, fundamentally different from 
CAFA—federal jurisdiction is employed to promote aggregation while 
maintaining fidelity to state law. Where CAFA was a Trojan horse, sending 
nationwide disputes to federal court to perish on the spear of Rule 23’s pre-
dominance requirement, Bristol-Myers channels nationwide disputes into a 
procedural vehicle in federal court that is actually designed to handle 
them—MDL. Bristol-Myers gets the best of all worlds—a federal judge it 
presumes to be unbiased, a forum that permits aggregation without the risk 
of class certification, and assurance that a single plaintiff-friendly state law 
will not apply to a nationwide set of claims. As a matter of federalism, MDL 
threads the needle between the policies of interstate comity demanded by 
Bristol-Myers and intrastate uniformity demanded by Erie and Klaxon.290 
B. Is MDL’s Shape-Shifting Beneficial? 
Although MDL pushes all of the right doctrinal buttons, whether it ac-
tually promotes the policies underlying Bristol-Myers and Klaxon, and 
whether it is good litigation policy more generally, are different questions. 
What should we think of federalizing nationwide mass litigation—even that 
which involves state-law claims—and centralizing it before a single federal 
judge for coordinated proceedings? 
In many ways, it makes a lot of sense for the nation’s courts to handle 
disputes that are nationwide in scope. Centralization of control over aggregate 
litigation in a single forum has many advantages for both the parties involved 
                                                                                                                           
 289 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 615 (1964); see Bradt, Shortest Distance, supra note 
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 290 Cf. Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Prelimi-
nary Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309, 320 (1991) (“[I]dentifying a single governing law . . . may be 
challenged as inappropriately intrusive on historic federalism interests and the rights of states to 
establish and enforce their own policy decisions.”). 
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and the judicial system. But it also creates risks, both in terms of the federal-
ism policies MDL facially advances and to the parties who are caught up in it. 
Although MDL’s great asset is its ability to accommodate traditional litigation 
norms, the combination of Bristol-Myers and MDL centralizes power in the 
federal MDL system. Whether that turns out to be good or bad will depend on 
how that power is channeled and wielded in the MDL process. 
1. MDL’s Fit with Federalism 
Structurally, MDL avoids the choice-of-law problems that plague class 
actions. Because the necessity of applying different states’ laws does not 
prevent aggregation, MDL can flourish without demanding any rethinking 
of Klaxon. In practice, however, Klaxon may really be honored only in the 
breach. Ironically, the very aggregation that MDL’s formal adherence to 
Klaxon allows, inevitably leads to some smoothing out of differences in the 
applicable law. 
To be sure, choice of law matters in MDL. When dispositive motions are 
decided, they must be decided according to the state law that the transferor 
court would have applied.291 And when juries are instructed in bellwether 
trials, they must be instructed according to the law that would have applied 
absent the transfer, even if the parties have consented to trial in the MDL 
court.292 
At the same time, however, MDLs are often resolved without fine-
grained attention to state law. Dispositive motions are sometimes decided in 
relation to so-called “consolidated complaints” that make only cursory dis-
tinctions between the laws applicable to different plaintiffs’ claims.293 And 
when an MDL judge grants summary judgment because the plaintiffs’ pro-
posed causation expert did not pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., that is done accord-
ing to the federal standard.294 Perhaps more importantly, when cases are 
resolved by global settlement agreement, those agreements—at least those 
made public—do not typically value the claims based on differences in the 
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applicable state law.295 That said, if an individual claimant believes he 
would do better at a trial decided under the applicable state law, he can al-
ways choose to reject the settlement and take his chances on remand. That 
this occurs so rarely probably has more to do with the dynamics of mass 
settlement than any detailed assessment of choice of law by claimants and 
their lawyers.296 
Finally, applying so many different states’ laws and choice-of-law 
rules is an extraordinarily complicated judicial task. As Larry Kramer has 
demonstrated, the pressure to avoid such complexity may create an irresist-
ible temptation to elide the differences in state law.297 Although such a con-
cession to the shortness of life is not in keeping with the spirit of Klaxon, 
one can hardly blame judges faced with the enormity of a massive MDL for 
making their assignment as simple as possible. Indeed, more and more law-
yers on both sides opt to directly file their cases into MDLs, without regard 
to the choice-of-law implications of doing so (often to their clients’ detri-
ment), suggesting that attorneys may be motivated by similar incentives to 
simplify.298 
Because so many MDLs are settled without regard to the variations in 
state law that would apply if the claims were litigated individually, the dif-
ferences in state law so studiously respected by Klaxon tend to be smoothed 
out. What results is not something as blunt as Judge Jack Weinstein’s at-
tempt to forge a “national consensus law” in In re Agent Orange Product 
Liability Litigation,299 but something more subtle—an undermining of the 
Klaxon principle while formally following it. This is the brilliance of MDL 
in a nutshell—it facilitates a nationwide aggregation that formally respects 
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our inherited norms while also sweeping them aside in the name of mass 
resolution. It is, in other words, a federalization of tort law without saying 
so—and in fact, saying quite the opposite. 
Whether this is a good or bad thing is somewhat beside the point. The 
deed is done. By channeling nationwide aggregation into MDL, the Su-
preme Court in Bristol-Myers has amplified this federalization trend. And 
there is potentially much to be said for it. 
There are benefits to resolving litigation of nationwide scope in federal 
court instead of state court. Nationwide mass torts—even those based en-
tirely on state law—often implicate federal law. Medical devices, drugs, 
automobiles, and many other consumer products that are frequently the sub-
ject of mass-tort litigation are regulated by a host of federal agencies (e.g., 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)), 
and courts handling these claims will often have to interpret the preemptive 
force of these regulations.300 Further, whether or not the defendant complied 
with federal regulations will often impact its liability under state tort law. 
For example, some states treat failure to comply with FDA regulations as 
negligence per se. Although the Supreme Court has said that this sort of 
federal ingredient in a state law claim is usually insufficient to invoke fed-
eral question jurisdiction, there is a risk that state courts might reach con-
flicting interpretations of the same federal laws.301 Similarly, when it comes 
to federal constitutional limits on punitive damages (another regular feature 
of mass torts), different state courts might reach different interpretations as 
to what those limits are, potentially subjecting defendants to multiple pun-
ishments for the same conduct.302 Concentrating nationwide mass-tort liti-
gation in federal MDL courts may lead to more uniformity on these sorts of 
federal issues than leaving the cases to be decided in multiple state courts, 
subject only to the Supreme Court’s limited ability to correct state-court 
errors after final judgment and appeal.303 And as a straightforward matter of 
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justice, there is appeal in victims being treated alike regardless of where 
they reside or are injured. 
If Klaxon is watered down, many would applaud the development, in-
cluding Henry Hart, were he still alive. Hart loathed Klaxon because he 
thought the federal courts were generally fairer than state courts, and partic-
ularly when it came to choice of law.304 In Hart’s view, federal courts should 
develop a federal common law of choice of law, rather than hew to states’ 
choice-of-law rules, which he believed would inevitably be parochial.305 
Allowing the federal courts to make choice-of-law determinations would 
reduce the incentive for plaintiffs to engage in interstate forum shopping.306 
Hart’s view, in that sense, is rather in line with the Supreme Court’s in Bris-
tol-Myers. The Court’s concern for policing plaintiff forum shopping in 
Bristol-Myers increased the likelihood that nationwide mass torts would be 
consolidated in a single federal forum that defendants presume will at least 
be less parochial than California. 
The MDL statute does not overrule Klaxon. But for those sympathetic 
to Hart’s position, MDL judges might be counted on to interpret states’ 
choice-of-law rules in ways that will be less biased toward application of 
forum law than state judges might be. The result, paradoxically, may be that 
federal control promotes more respect for different states’ laws than consol-
idation in a single state court, which may be more inclined to apply its own 
law to govern the whole nation. Handling nationwide disputes at the federal 
level would, therefore, limit the spillover effects that inevitably occur when 
states attempt to apply their own substantive law or procedural rules to ac-
tivity that crosses state lines, even if it comes with a little smoothing out 
around the edges.307 In the end, channeling nationwide litigation into a sin-
gle federal court may be a defensible theory of allocating cases between 
local and national courts. 
As Edward Purcell has taught us, however, the principal shortcoming 
in Hart’s thinking was that he dismissed the problems of intrastate disuni-
formity, and the system of vertical forum shopping by defendants it fos-
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tered, which led to Erie itself.308 So although there is appeal in MDL’s ca-
pacity to smooth out the differences in state law in nationwide disputes, it 
comes with the risk that states’ regulatory interests and plaintiffs’ substan-
tive rights under state law will be subverted in service of the goal of effi-
cient resolution of cases. Each plaintiff may, of course, insist on fidelity to 
Klaxon by opting for remand to the district in which the case was filed for a 
trial under the law that would apply in that state. But the realities of MDL—
lengthy proceedings, centralized prosecution by the steering committee, and 
settlements designed to discourage opting out—may make remand more of 
a theoretical possibility than an attractive option. If the MDL process works 
unfairly in defendants’ favor, then there is a risk of replicating the defects 
that provoked Erie. 
In sum, regardless of one’s view of Klaxon, it is likely that the contin-
ued dominance of MDL, boosted by Bristol-Myers, will advance the feder-
alization trend. Such federalization will not be complete, however, because 
the MDL court must follow Klaxon when it is pertinent. The real question in 
MDL will be whether its dominance will replicate the problem that under-
girded Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie: whether the federal courts will be 
overwhelmingly friendly to corporate defendants at the expense of plain-
tiffs. The answer to that question depends less on whether Klaxon is fol-
lowed to the letter, and more on how MDL courts exercise the power they 
now have. In short, if the cases are going to be centralized before a single 
federal judge, and almost certainly resolved through a mass settlement, the 
crucial question becomes how to ensure that those settlements are funda-
mentally fair. 
2. MDL’s Centralization Power 
Although we have portrayed federal MDL as aggregation on defend-
ants’ terms—at least when compared to a world where plaintiffs can bring 
nationwide litigation in the state court of their choosing—it is not only de-
fendants who benefit. Consolidating nearly all litigation arising out of a na-
tionwide course of conduct in a single federal forum, rather than allowing 
plaintiffs to maintain parallel aggregate litigation in state courts, may also 
work to the advantage of the judicial system, society, and even plaintiffs 
themselves. 
Some potential benefits are obvious, like the efficiencies that can be 
gained by avoiding duplicative pretrial proceedings, such as discovery and 
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motion practice, and the legal fees and judicial resources that they con-
sume.309 By making nationwide or multistate aggregations impractical or 
unattractive in state court, Bristol-Myers also mitigates a problem that has 
bedeviled MDL for years—how to handle parallel state court litigation.310 
Federal MDL judges and state judges managing parallel proceedings have, 
for the most part, shown a remarkable ability to work together to coordinate 
these matters as much as possible.311 But reducing the need for such inter-
system coordination would undoubtedly yield savings for all involved and 
avoid those instances where federal and state judges butt heads. 
Beyond the savings from avoiding duplicative proceedings, complete 
(or near complete) aggregation may actually create value for the parties in-
volved. Defendants are often willing to pay a peace premium for a global 
settlement that can resolve all of the claims in a single transaction.312 Doing 
so allows them to avoid the risk of adverse selection—that is, overpaying to 
settle the weakest claims only to be left facing the strongest claims in con-
tinued litigation—as well as the negative publicity and drag on stock price 
that is often disproportionate to the number of remaining claims.313 Simply 
put, defendants will often pay extra to put the whole dispute behind them, 
and, indeed, often insist on very high participation thresholds as a condition 
of any mass settlement.314 Plaintiffs, therefore, stand to gain if they can 
bundle all of their claims together and offer the defendant something ap-
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proaching total peace.315 Having nearly all of the claims consolidated in a 
federal MDL, managed by a single plaintiffs’ steering committee, may make 
it easier for plaintiffs to bundle them up than if many claims are also pend-
ing in multiple parallel state-court proceedings.316 Additionally, this central-
ization reduces opportunities for competing lawyers to use state-court pro-
ceedings to attempt to sabotage or hold up a global settlement reached in 
the MDL. 
Indeed, some scholars have argued that anything short of complete ag-
gregation in mass torts leaves plaintiffs (and society) worse off.317 Although 
some plaintiffs may prefer to control their own claims—either because they 
have atypically strong claims or because they hope to strategically hold up a 
global settlement in exchange for a side payment—doing so may come at 
the expense of the group of plaintiffs as a whole and undermine the deter-
rent effect of mass-tort litigation.318 But one need not go so far to see that 
there is strength in numbers, and procedures that facilitate aggregation—
even over the objection of some individuals—can increase plaintiffs’ collec-
tive leverage in settlement negotiations.319 MDL will never go as far to-
wards complete aggregation as the mandatory class action that these schol-
ars advocate. Plaintiffs who reside in the defendant’s home states may be 
stuck in state court, unable to join the federal MDL.320 Other plaintiffs 
might decide to take their chances suing alone in their home states, perhaps 
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hoping to free ride on the MDL. And, of course, plaintiffs in MDL are not 
bound by any global settlement unless they affirmatively opt into it; they 
can always threaten to hold out, wait for remand, and take their claims to 
trial. But by reducing the opportunities and incentives for rival plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to set up competing aggregations in the state courts of their choice 
and forcing them to work together in MDL, Bristol-Myers may in some 
ways actually strengthen the plaintiffs’ hand as a group and increase the 
deterrent effect of their litigation. 
Still, the near total aggregation of nationwide litigation in MDL also 
comes with risks. Centralization of cases in MDL increases the power of 
both the MDL judge and the court-appointed lawyers who manage the liti-
gation on both sides. And new risks arise any time power is concentrated. 
With potentially thousands of cases consolidated in an MDL, the judge 
cannot simply let the plaintiffs run their own cases through their own law-
yers. Out of practical necessity, control over the course of the litigation is 
centralized in a handful of lawyers on the court-appointed plaintiffs’ steer-
ing committee.321 Those lawyers make most of the important strategic deci-
sions on what discovery to pursue, which experts to hire, which cases to 
push forward towards bellwether trials, and lead the negotiations toward 
possible global settlements. So, although each plaintiff in the MDL has 
hired his or her own lawyer, those lawyers typically have little input into 
how their clients’ individual cases are litigated for as long as they remain 
consolidated in the MDL.322 They are at the mercy of the lead lawyers until 
the MDL judge determines that pretrial proceedings are over or the parties 
reach some sort of global settlement agreement. 
When so much power is consolidated in the hands of a small group of 
lawyers, the usual risk of any principal-agent relationship arises: the lead 
lawyers might sell out the plaintiffs in the MDL by cutting a deal with the 
defendant to settle on the cheap in exchange for generous fees.323 Of course, 
the agency risks are not as stark as in a class action. The lead lawyers will 
still have to pitch the deal to the plaintiffs, who must opt in to be bound, and 
in an MDL, those plaintiffs will typically have their own lawyers. But even 
when they are separately represented, MDL plaintiffs will often lack suffi-
cient information to evaluate the settlement offer, and their lawyers may not 
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have the right incentives to fully explain it.324 Indeed, some MDL settle-
ments contain powerful closure provisions designed to make it difficult for 
plaintiffs to reject the settlement and to tie peripheral lawyers’ financial in-
centives to their ability to deliver their entire inventories of plaintiffs.325 The 
controversial In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation settlement, for exam-
ple, required participating lawyers to withdraw from representing any client 
who did not want to settle, essentially saying, “take the deal or find another 
lawyer.”326  
The more power that is concentrated in the hands of the lead lawyers, 
the greater the risk that they will structure the deal with the defendant to 
benefit themselves instead of the plaintiffs. And the more the lead lawyers 
are able to suppress competition from or co-opt rival lawyers, the greater 
the chance that plaintiffs with atypically strong claims might find them-
selves with little choice but to accept a settlement that does not account for 
the factors that make their claims so valuable, resulting in a sort of “damag-
es averaging.” 
One of the limits on the power of lead lawyers in MDLs has been the 
existence of competing power centers in parallel state court litigation. Law-
yers who have amassed substantial inventories of cases—inside or outside 
of the MDL—can serve as a potent counterweight to the lead lawyers in the 
MDL.327 And lawyers who have assembled sizable state court aggrega-
tions—like the one the plaintiffs tried to create in Bristol-Myers—have an 
added degree of independence from the MDL lead lawyers. Although these 
outside lawyers often cooperate informally with the lawyers in the MDL, 
sharing discovery, expert reports, trial materials, and the like, they are not 
beholden to the MDL lead lawyers or shackled by their strategic deci-
sions.328 These state court lawyers, operating on a different timetable in 
front of a different judge, could often drive the litigation forward by press-
ing for trials in state court ahead of the MDL judge’s schedule for bellweth-
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er trials, which may also help inform global settlement discussions.329 And 
lawyers who control substantial inventories of cases that they can manage 
independently will often be in a position to push back against MDL lead 
lawyers who might have gotten too cozy with the defendant or be willing to 
shortchange some classes of plaintiffs. 
If we are correct that Bristol-Myers will significantly limit plaintiffs’ 
ability to aggregate in state courts and that most plaintiffs will prefer MDL 
to litigating on the defendant’s home turf, then Bristol-Myers may eliminate 
some of these competing power centers and consolidate more control over 
mass-tort litigation in the hands of MDL lead lawyers.330 Lawyers who 
might have tried to set up a competing nationwide aggregation in state court 
will instead have to work through the MDL leadership structure, reducing 
their independence and leverage. Although increased centralization of liti-
gation in MDL has many benefits—not the least of which is making it hard-
er for state court lawyers to strategically hold up a deal—it may also weak-
en a potential competitive check on the lead lawyers in the MDL. 
Discouraging parallel state-court aggregations also consolidates power 
in the hands of the single federal judge tasked with overseeing the MDL. 
This is, of course, exactly what MDL’s creators intended, as Judge Becker’s 
quip about the dangers of “letting plaintiffs run their cases” illustrates.331 
But there is risk any time power is consolidated in the hands of a single per-
son. Indeed, some scholars have criticized MDL judges for acting imperi-
ously.332 Although we are generally optimistic about how MDL judges ex-
ercise their power, we must admit that the formal mechanisms for checking 
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MDL judges are few and far between.333 MDL judges have tremendous 
flexibility and discretion in how they manage pretrial proceedings; indeed, 
that is one of MDL’s great strengths in confronting the unique problems of 
mass cases.334 But this broad discretion, combined with the fact that most 
MDLs result in global settlements, without any sort of appealable final 
judgment, often makes appellate review unavailable or unavailing.335  
And even though the MDL judge cannot try transferred cases absent 
the parties’ consent, plaintiffs are generally stuck in an MDL until the MDL 
judge lets them go. The power to remand cases to the districts where they 
were originally filed lies with the JPML. But the Panel seldom, if ever, ac-
tually issues a remand order without the recommendation of the MDL 
judge.336 By making large-scale aggregation in state court impracticable and 
decreasing the need for the MDL judge to cooperate with state-court judg-
es—and the ability of at least a subset of plaintiffs to potentially get differ-
ent rulings from them—Bristol-Myers concentrates even more power in an 
already powerful figure. 
In short, the benefits of centralization to plaintiffs in terms of increased 
leverage and the ability to offer peace in exchange for a premium create the 
risks of agent disloyalty and individual plaintiffs getting short-changed. The 
benefits to the judicial system and society of efficiency and closer-to-
optimal deterrence come with the risk of concentrating power in the hands 
of a single MDL judge. And the benefits to the defendant of the chance to 
achieve a comprehensive resolution come with the risk of plaintiffs with 
meritless claims coming out of the woodwork once a settlement is an-
nounced, hoping for an easy payday. Whether the benefits of increased cen-
tralization of power in MDL outweigh the risks will largely turn on how 
MDLs are managed and resolved. Bristol-Myers thus increases the need to 
focus on ensuring that MDL is both efficient and fair for all involved. 
As MDLs have grown, a vibrant conversation has emerged about how 
best to manage and resolve them. Scholars—ourselves included—have of-
fered proposals on matters as wide-ranging as how lead lawyers are chosen 
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and compensated,337 how MDL judges handle choice-of-law problems,338 
how the litigation is financed,339 how bellwether trials are chosen and man-
aged,340 and the role of the MDL judge in supervising global settlements.341 
And, of course, with more cases consolidated in MDL proceedings, the 
JPML’s choice of a transferee judge becomes all the more consequential. 
With Bristol-Myers enhancing the already enormous footprint of MDL, 
judges should take the opportunity to experiment with these proposals to 
best guarantee that the power of MDL is deployed fairly. 
CONCLUSION 
Bristol-Myers professes modesty. It claims to have broken no new 
ground in personal jurisdiction, but it in fact shifts the ground under one of 
the fastest growing portions of the federal docket. By making aggregation in 
state court impracticable or unattractive, Bristol-Myers will result, not in the 
dispersal of cases in state courts around the country, but rather in the wide-
spread federalization of mass-tort litigation in MDL. 
To some degree, Bristol-Myers is another move in the ongoing chess 
match between lawyers on both sides in complex litigation. When defend-
ants successfully close off one avenue of aggregation, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
open a new road.342 So it was here. When CAFA made nationwide mass-tort 
class actions in state court a thing of the past, plaintiffs’ lawyers structured 
non-class aggregations designed to avoid removal. Defendants countered 
with a new strategy—to break up those aggregations by attacking the state 
court’s personal jurisdiction under the Supreme Court’s new restrictive ap-
proach. This gambit was successful, and the results are likely to channel 
more aggregate litigation into the federal courts under the auspices of MDL. 
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Defendants may have won this round, but there is no reason to believe 
that it will be the last one. With MDL now the best available playing field 
for mass-tort litigation, both sides will continue to attempt to contort that 
process to their best advantage. Indeed, as this Article and the burgeoning 
scholarly work in this area demonstrate, there are many ways to subtly in-
fluence the process to the benefit of one’s client. From the early-stage at-
tempts to affect the choice of the MDL judge, to the staging of dispositive 
motions, to the negotiation of settlement terms, opportunities abound. In-
deed, those interested in wholesale changes to the MDL process might look 
to persuade Chief Justice Roberts to make different appointments to the 
JPML or persuade the Rules Committee to intervene.343 
We have also begun to see attempts to transform MDL litigation on the 
whole, beyond the particulars of individual cases—to “play for rules.”344 
After many years of unsuccessfully pushing legislation to “reform” class 
action litigation with a bill entitled the “Fairness in Class Action Litigation 
Act,” that bill reemerged in the Congress in 2017 after the Republicans 
achieved unified control of the legislative and executive branches.345 But 
there was something different about this bill this time around: a brand new 
section proposing numerous reforms to the nuts and bolts of MDL litiga-
tion, including new requirements for pleading, bellwether trials, and manda-
tory interlocutory appeals. The House passed the bill on a party-line vote 
without debating the proposals’ merits in hearings of any kind. Although the 
legislation currently languishes in the Senate, the inclusion of the MDL 
provisions signals a new front in the complex litigation wars. 
And if MDL evolves too far to favor one side or the other, there is al-
ways the possibility that aggrieved defendants or plaintiffs will mount a 
frontal attack on MDL itself, arguing that the functionally nationwide juris-
diction that MDL courts exercise in mass torts is unconstitutional for rea-
sons similar to those that convinced the Court in Bristol-Myers. Although 
we might not be persuaded, and consider it unlikely, one could certainly 
imagine how a Supreme Court hell-bent on cutting back on the power of 
MDL could find grounds for doing so by raising the arguments against the 
scope of MDL’s jurisdiction that have been ignored for the last fifty years. 
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For the time being, at least, Bristol-Myers appears to have laid the 
groundwork for a stable equilibrium where the major players will view fed-
eral multidistrict litigation as the best available option for litigating and re-
solving mass torts. MDL has thus become the centerpiece of the civil litiga-
tion system that its architects envisioned fifty years ago. And it is, indeed, a 
powerful and flexible tool for resolving disputes that are nationwide in 
scope. But the game is not over. 
